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Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain

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  • Richard Belfield
  • David Marsden

Abstract

Using data from large-scale establishment surveys in Britain and France, we show that incentive pay for non-managers is more widespread in France than in Britain. We explain this finding in terms of the 'beneficial constraint' arising from stronger employment protection in France, which provides an impulse to develop incentive pay; employer networking activities in France, which facilitate joint learning about its development and operation; and government fiscal incentives for profit-sharing, which reduces the cost of its operation.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Belfield & David Marsden, 2009. "Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain," CEP Discussion Papers dp0941, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    • Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0941
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    incentive systems; merit pay; profit-sharing; employer networks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    • J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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