IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/uersrr/262210.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Options for Improving Conservation Programs: Insights from Auction Theory and Economic Experiments

Author

Listed:
  • Hellerstein, Daniel
  • Higgins, Nathaniel
  • Roberts, Michael J.

Abstract

The U.S. Department of Agriculture spends over $5 billion per year on conservation programs, mostly on voluntary programs that give financial assistance to farmers and landowners to provide environmental services (such as implementing nutrient management programs or planting native grasses). Since most programs cannot fund all interested parties, program managers must use some mechanism to select applicants. One option is to elicit offers through an auction. This report addresses the use of auctions in conservation programs. It considers how information in the hands of Government officials and rural landowners affects the auction’s performance, and how auction design can reduce Government expenditures or encourage landowners to provide greater environmental services. Results of laboratory experiments are discussed, highlighting shortcomings of common features of conservation program auctions (such as limits on the rent landowners may request), as well as how alternative auction designs can improve performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Hellerstein, Daniel & Higgins, Nathaniel & Roberts, Michael J., 2015. "Options for Improving Conservation Programs: Insights from Auction Theory and Economic Experiments," Economic Research Report 262210, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uersrr:262210
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.262210
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/262210/files/50532_err181.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/262210/files/50532_err181.pdf?subformat=pdfa
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.262210?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven Schilizzi & Uwe Latacz-Lohmann, 2007. "Assessing the Performance of Conservation Auctions: An Experimental Study," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 83(4), pages 497-515.
    2. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
    3. Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Erkut Y. Ozbay, 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1407-1418, September.
    4. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521551847, September.
    5. Michael H. Rothkopf, 1969. "A Model of Rational Competitive Bidding," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(7), pages 362-373, March.
    6. Harry J. Paarsch & Han Hong, 2006. "An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262162350, April.
    7. Rodney B.W. Smith, 1995. "The Conservation Reserve Program as a Least-Cost Land Retirement Mechanism," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 77(1), pages 93-105.
    8. Loretta J. Mester, 1995. "There's more than one way to sell a security: the Treasury's auction experiment," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Jul, pages 3-17.
    9. Schilizzi, Steven & Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe, 2007. "Assessing the performance of conservation auctions: an experimental study," 2007 Conference (51st), February 13-16, 2007, Queenstown, New Zealand 10436, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    10. Jason F. Shogren, 2004. "Incentive Mechanism Testbeds: Discussion," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1218-1219.
    11. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-955, December.
    12. Smith, Vernon L, 1976. "Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 274-279, May.
    13. Menezes, Flavio M., 2008. "An Introduction to Auction Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199275991.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rosenberg, Andrew B. & Pratt, Bryan & Arnold, David & Williams, Ryan, 2024. "Land Use of Rejected, Enrolled, and Expiring Fields in the Conservation Reserve Program," Economic Information Bulletin 344828, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    2. Liesbeth Colen & Sergio Gomez y Paloma & Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Marianne Lefebvre & Raphaële Préget & Sophie Thoyer, 2016. "Economic Experiments as a Tool for Agricultural Policy Evaluation: Insights from the European CAP," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 64(4), pages 667-694, December.
    3. Boxall, Peter C. & Perger, Orsolya & Packman, Katherine & Weber, Marian, 2017. "An experimental examination of target based conservation auctions," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 592-600.
    4. Banerjee, Simanti & Conte, Marc, 2018. "Role of Information and Communication on Spatial Conservation Auction Performance: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment," Cornhusker Economics 307053, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    5. Baumber, Alex, 2017. "Enhancing ecosystem services through targeted bioenergy support policies," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 26(PA), pages 98-110.
    6. Stephanie Rosch & Sharon Raszap Skorbiansky & Collin Weigel & Kent D. Messer & Daniel Hellerstein, 2021. "Barriers to Using Economic Experiments in Evidence‐Based Agricultural Policymaking," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(2), pages 531-555, June.
    7. Pratt, Bryan & Wallander, Steven, 2022. "Cover Practice Definitions and Incentives in the Conservation Reserve Program," USDA Miscellaneous 323862, United States Department of Agriculture.
    8. Cramton, Peter & Hellerstein, Daniel & Higgins, Nathaniel & Iovanna, Richard & López-Vargas, Kristian & Wallander, Steven, 2021. "Improving the cost-effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve Program: A laboratory study," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    9. Lim, Siew & Wachenheim, Cheryl, 2022. "Predicted enrollment in alternative attribute Conservation Reserve Program contracts," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    10. Banerjee, Simanti & Conte, Marc N., 2017. "Balancing Complexity and Rent-Seeking in Multi-Attribute Conservation Procurement Auctions: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment," 2018 Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 5-7, 2018, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 266293, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    11. Liesbeth Colen & Sergio Gomez Y Paloma & Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Marianne Lefebvre & Sophie Thoyer & Raphaële Préget, 2015. "(How) can economic experiments inform EU agricultural policy?," JRC Research Reports JRC97340, Joint Research Centre.
    12. Leah H. Palm-Forster & Scott M. Swinton & Frank Lupi & Robert S. Shupp, 2016. "Too Burdensome to Bid: Transaction Costs and Pay-for-Performance Conservation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1314-1333.
    13. Jennifer Ifft & Deepak Rajagopal & Ryan Weldzuis, 2019. "Ethanol Plant Location and Land Use: A Case Study of CRP and the Ethanol Mandate," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(1), pages 37-55, March.
    14. Uchida, Emi & Swallow, Stephen K. & Gold, Arthur J. & Opaluch, James & Kafle, Achyut & Merrill, Nathaniel H. & Michaud, Clayton & Gill, Carrie Anne, 2018. "Integrating Watershed Hydrology and Economics to Establish a Local Market for Water Quality Improvement: A Field Experiment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 17-25.
    15. Banerjee, Simanti & Conte, Marc, 2018. "Complexity and Efficiency in Conservation Auctions: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment," Cornhusker Economics 307041, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    16. Pratt, Bryan & Wallander, Steven, 2022. "Cover Practice Definitions and Incentives in the Conservation Reserve Program," Economic Information Bulletin 327358, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    17. Hellerstein, Daniel M., 2017. "The US Conservation Reserve Program: The evolution of an enrollment mechanism," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 601-610.
    18. Ben Ayara, Amine & Cho, Seong-Hoon & Clark, Christopher & Lambert, Dayton & Armsworth, Paul, 2016. "Spatial and Temporal Variation in the Optimal Provision of Forest-based Carbon Storage," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 236005, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    19. Star, Megan & Rolfe, John & Barbi, Emily, 2019. "Do outcome or input risks limit adoption of environmental projects: Rehabilitating gullies in Great Barrier Reef catchments," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 73-82.
    20. Wallander, Steven & Paul, Laura A. & Ferraro, Paul J. & Messer, Kent D. & Iovanna, Richard, 2023. "Informational nudges in conservation auctions: A field experiment with U.S. farmers," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    21. Kim, Youngho & Lichtenberg, Erik & Newburn, David, 2022. "Payments and Penalties in Ecosystem Services Programs," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322103, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    22. Marc N. Conte & Robert M. Griffin, 2017. "Quality Information and Procurement Auction Outcomes: Evidence from a Payment for Ecosystem Services Laboratory Experiment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 99(3), pages 571-591, April.
    23. Nicole Karwowski, 2022. "Estimating the Effect of Easements on Agricultural Production," NBER Chapters, in: American Agriculture, Water Resources, and Climate Change, pages 53-105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    24. Janusch, Nicholas & Palm-Forster, Leah H. & Messer, Kent D. & Ferraro, Paul J., 2017. "Behavioral Insights for Agri-Environmental Program and Policy Design," 2018 Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 5-7, 2018, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 266299, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    2. Michael A. Arnold & Joshua M. Duke & Kent D. Messer, 2013. "Adverse Selection in Reverse Auctions for Ecosystem Services," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 89(3), pages 387-412.
    3. Steven Schilizzi & Uwe Latacz-Lohmann, 2012. "Evaluating Conservation Auctions with Unknown Bidder Costs: The Scottish Fishing Vessel Decommissioning Program," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 88(4), pages 658-673.
    4. Janusch, Nicholas R. & Messer, Kent D. & Ferraro, Paul J. & Allen, William, 2017. "Farmer participation in nutrient management practices in Delaware: A field experiment," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 258456, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Schilizzi, Steven & Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe, 2009. "Predicting the performance of conservation tenders when information on bidders's costs is limited," 2009 Conference (53rd), February 11-13, 2009, Cairns, Australia 48171, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    7. Hellerstein, Daniel & Higgins, Nathaniel, 2010. "The Effective Use of Limited Information: Do Bid Maximums Reduce Procurement Cost in Asymmetric Auctions?," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 288-304, April.
    8. Sundström, David, 2016. "A Comparison of Techniques to Evaluate Policies in Public Procurement," Umeå Economic Studies 928, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 17 Jun 2016.
    9. Ravi Kashyap, 2018. "Auction Theory Adaptations for Real Life Applications," Papers 1810.01736, arXiv.org, revised May 2019.
    10. Laura Brown & Elizabeth Troutt & Cynthia Edwards & Brian Gray & Wanjing Hu, 2011. "A Uniform Price Auction for Conservation Easements in the Canadian Prairies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(1), pages 49-60, September.
    11. Vogt, Nora & Bizer, Kilian, 2013. "Lock-in effects in competitive bidding schemes for payments for ecosystem services: Revisiting the fundamental transformation," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 158, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    12. Söllner, Matthias, 2008. "Menschliches Verhalten in elektronischen Märkten," Bayreuth Reports on Information Systems Management 34, University of Bayreuth, Chair of Information Systems Management.
    13. Dejan Trifunović, 2011. "Single Object Auctions With Interdependent Values," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 56(188), pages 125-170, January –.
    14. David Evans & Andrew Reeson, 2022. "The Performance of a Repeated Discriminatory Price Auction for Ecosystem Services," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 81(4), pages 787-806, April.
    15. Hellerstein, Daniel M., 2017. "The US Conservation Reserve Program: The evolution of an enrollment mechanism," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 601-610.
    16. Vergamini, Daniele & Viaggi, Davide & Raggi, Meri, 2016. "Agri-environmental measures and farmers’ rent: evaluating the potential contribution of auctions to increase the efficiency of Agri-environmental schemes in Emilia-Romagna (Italy)," 2016 Fifth AIEAA Congress, June 16-17, 2016, Bologna, Italy 242443, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA).
    17. Krishna Pant, 2015. "Uniform-Price Reverse Auction for Estimating the Costs of Reducing Open-Field Burning of Rice Residue in Nepal," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(3), pages 567-581, November.
    18. Adrien Coiffard & Raphaële Préget & Mabel Tidball, 2023. "Target versus budget reverse auctions: an online experiment using the strategy method," Working Papers hal-04055743, HAL.
    19. Adrien Coiffard & Raphaële Préget & Mabel Tidball, 2023. "Target versus budget reverse auctions: an online experiment using the strategy method," CEE-M Working Papers hal-04055743, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
    20. Frans P. Vries & Nick Hanley, 2016. "Incentive-Based Policy Design for Pollution Control and Biodiversity Conservation: A Review," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 687-702, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:uersrr:262210. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ersgvus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.