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A Comparison of Techniques to Evaluate Policies in Public Procurement

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Abstract

Empirical evaluations of policies implemented through public procurements are commonly carried out using linear regressions or by more involved nonlinear structural models. The aspiration is typically to determine a marginal effect. Here, I compare marginal effects generated under both types of specifications. I study how a political initiative to make firms less environmentally damaging implemented through public procurements influence Swedish firms’ behavior. The collected evidence brings about a statistically as well as economically significant effect on firms’ bids and costs.

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  • Sundström, David, 2016. "A Comparison of Techniques to Evaluate Policies in Public Procurement," Umeå Economic Studies 928, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 17 Jun 2016.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0928
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    binding function; green public procurement; indirect inference; orthogonal polynomial regression; simulation estimation; structural estimation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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