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International Conflict and Leadership Tenure

In: The Handbook on the Political Economy of War

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  • Randall J. Blimes

Abstract

By defining political economy and war in the broadest sense, this unique Handbook brings together a wide range of interdisciplinary scholars from economics, political science, sociology, and policy studies to address a multitude of important topics. These include an analysis of why wars begin, how wars are waged, what happens after war has ceased, and the various alternatives to war. Other sections explore civil war and revolution, the arms trade, economic and political systems, and post-conflict reconstruction and nation building. Policymakers as well as academics and students of political science, economics, public policy and sociology will find this volume to be an engaging and enlightening read.

Suggested Citation

  • Randall J. Blimes, 2011. "International Conflict and Leadership Tenure," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13385_16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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