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A Theory of Power Wars

Author

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  • Helios Herrera
  • Massimo Morelli
  • Salvatore Nunnari

Abstract

We present a theory of war onset and war duration in which power is multidimensional and can evolve through conflict. The resources players can secure without fighting are determined by their political power, while the ability of appropriating resources with violence is due to their military power. When deciding whether to wage a war, players evaluate the consequences on the current allocation of resources as well as on the future distribution of military and political powers. We deliver three main results: a key driver of war is the mismatch between military and political power; dynamic incentives may amplify static incentives, leading forward-looking players to be more belligerent; and a war is more likely to last for longer if political power is initially more unbalanced than military power and the politically under-represented player is militarily advantaged. Our results are robust to allowing the peaceful allocation of resources to be a function of both political and military powers. Finally, we provide empirical correlations on interstate wars that are consistent with the theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli & Salvatore Nunnari, 2022. "A Theory of Power Wars," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 17(1), pages 1-30, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00019136
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00019136
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    Cited by:

    1. Giacomo Battiston & Matteo Bizzarri & Riccardo Franceschin, 2021. "Third-Party Interest, Resource Value, and the Likelihood of Conflict," CSEF Working Papers 631, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 20 Jun 2022.
    2. Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2023. "Natural resources and conflict: The crucial role of power mismatch and geographic asymmetries," Working Papers 698, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    3. Serhat Doğan & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2023. "Analyzing strategic behavior in a dynamic model of bargaining and war," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 233-257, December.

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