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Time Bombs

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  • Susan Hannah Allen

    (Department of Political Science, Texas Tech University, Lubbock)

Abstract

Advancements in technology coupled with the perception of diminished public tolerance for casualties have increased the prominence and popularity of aerial bombing as a coercive tool, particularly for the United States. Despite interest from policy makers and support from the public, there has been little scholarly assessment of these coercive episodes. How successful are air campaigns, and what are the prospects for the future? In this article, I focus on the factors that cause bombing campaigns to end. To explore what leads to campaign termination, I highlight the theoretical significance of the political characteristics of both the attacker and the adversary. Using competing risks duration analysis to examine both failed and successful bombing campaigns from 1917 through 1999, I find that a democratic government on either side of the coercive equation increases the likelihood of campaigns ending.

Suggested Citation

  • Susan Hannah Allen, 2007. "Time Bombs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 112-133, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:51:y:2007:i:1:p:112-133
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002706296153
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    References listed on IDEAS

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