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Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining

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  • LEVENOTOĞLU, BAHAR
  • TARAR, AHMER

Abstract

We use a formal bargaining model to examine why, in many domestic and international bargaining situations, one or both negotiators make public statements in front of their constituents committing themselves to obtaining certain benefits in the negotiations. We find that making public commitments provides bargaining leverage, when backing down from such commitments carries domestic political costs. However, when the two negotiators face fairly similar costs for violating a public commitment, a prisoner's dilemma is created in which both sides make high public demands which cannot be satisfied, and both negotiators would be better off if they could commit to not making public demands. However, making a public demand is a dominant strategy for each negotiator, and this leads to a suboptimal outcome. Escaping this prisoner's dilemma provides a rationale for secret negotiations. Testable hypotheses are derived from the nature of the commitments and agreements made in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Levenotoğlu, Bahar & Tarar, Ahmer, 2005. "Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 419-433, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:99:y:2005:i:03:p:419-433_05
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    Cited by:

    1. Lindsey Doyle & Lukas Hegele, 2021. "Talks before the talks: Effects of pre-negotiation on reaching peace agreements in intrastate armed conflicts, 2005–15," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(2), pages 231-247, March.
    2. Dutta, Rohan, 2012. "Bargaining with revoking costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 144-153.
    3. Valentin L. Krustev & T. Clifton Morgan, 2011. "Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 351-376, September.
    4. Jonathan N. Brown, 2014. "The sound of silence: Power, secrecy, and international audiences in US military basing negotiations," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(4), pages 406-431, September.
    5. Xiaojun Li & Dingding Chen, 2021. "Public opinion, international reputation, and audience costs in an authoritarian regime," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(5), pages 543-560, September.
    6. Andrew H. Kydd & Roseanne W. McManus, 2017. "Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(2), pages 325-348, February.
    7. Basak, Deepal, 2023. "Bargaining under almost complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    8. Shawn L. Ramirez, 2018. "Mediation in the shadow of an audience: How third parties use secrecy and agenda-setting to broker settlements," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(1), pages 119-146, January.
    9. Barbara Dluhosch & Nikolai Ziegler, 2011. "The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 325-354, December.
    10. Randall J. Blimes, 2011. "International Conflict and Leadership Tenure," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Miettinen, Topi & Vanberg, Christoph, 2020. "Commitment and Conflict in Multilateral Bargaining," Working Papers 0679, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    12. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Resisting persuasion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 723-742, October.
    13. Douglas M. Stinnett, 2007. "International Uncertainty, Foreign Policy Flexibility, and Surplus Majority Coalitions in Israel," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(3), pages 470-495, June.
    14. Chung, Bobby W. & Wood, Daniel H., 2019. "Threats and promises in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 37-50.
    15. Julie Browne & Eric S. Dickson, 2010. "‘‘We Don’t Talk to Terrorists’’: On the Rhetoric and Practice of Secret Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(3), pages 379-407, June.

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