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Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy

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  • MORROW, JAMES D.
  • DE MESQUITA, BRUCE BUENO
  • SIVERSON, RANDOLPH M.
  • SMITH, ALASTAIR

Abstract

Kevin Clarke and Randall Stone (2008) offer a methodological critique of some of our tests of the selectorate theory in The Logic of Political Survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). We accept their critique of residualization for control variables in those tests, but reject the contention that the size of the winning coalition does not predict the provision of public goods and private benefits. We present new tests that control for elements of democracy other than W and that do not use residualization. These new tests show that selectorate theory is strongly and robustly supported. Our measure of the size of the winning coalition is in the theoretically predicted direction and is statistically significant for 28 out of 31 different public goods and private benefits. Aspects of democracy not contained in the selectorate theory explain less of the variance than does the theory's core factor, namely, winning coalition size, for 25 of the 31 public goods and private benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Morrow, James D. & De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno & Siverson, Randolph M. & Smith, Alastair, 2008. "Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 393-400, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:102:y:2008:i:03:p:393-400_08
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    1. Stanley L. Winer & J. Stephen Ferris & Bharatee Bhusana Dash & Pinaki Chakraborty, 2021. "Political competitiveness and the private–public structure of public expenditure: a model and empirics for the Indian States," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(6), pages 1430-1471, December.
    2. Andreas Kammerlander & Kerstin Unfried, 2022. "Sending peace home?! The effect of political favoritism on conflict," HiCN Working Papers 378, Households in Conflict Network.
    3. Shu Yu & Richard Jong-A-Pin, 2016. "Political leader survival: does competence matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 113-142, January.
    4. Jonathan N. Brown, 2014. "The sound of silence: Power, secrecy, and international audiences in US military basing negotiations," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(4), pages 406-431, September.
    5. Bruno Emmanuel Ongo Nkoa & Jacques Simon Song, 2022. "Does Institutional Quality increase inequalities in Africa?," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 13(3), pages 1896-1927, September.
    6. J Stephen Ferris & Stanley L. Winer, 2018. "Political Competitiveness and Fiscal Structure: A Time Series Analysis. Canada, 1870 - 2015," CESifo Working Paper Series 7220, CESifo.
    7. Kemp-Benedict, Eric, 2011. "Inequality, trust, and sustainability," MPRA Paper 33288, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Kemp-Benedict, Eric, 2011. "Political regimes and income inequality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(3), pages 266-268.
    9. Randall J. Blimes, 2011. "International Conflict and Leadership Tenure," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Sally Anderson & Mark Souva, 2010. "The Accountability Effects of Political Institutions and Capitalism on Interstate Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(4), pages 543-565, August.
    11. Biondo, A.E. & Brosio, G. & Pluchino, A. & Zanola, R., 2022. "Authoritarianism vs. democracy: Simulating responses to disease outbreaks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 594(C).

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