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Democracy and the Logic of Political Survival

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  • CLARKE, KEVIN A.
  • STONE, RANDALL W.

Abstract

Although democracy is a key concept in political science, debate continues over definitions and mechanisms. Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow (2003) make the important claim that most of democracy's effects are in fact due to something conceptually simpler and empirically easier to measure than democracy: the size of the minimum winning coalition that selects the leader. The argument is intuitively appealing and supported by extensive data analysis. Unfortunately, the statistical technique they use induces omitted variable bias into their results. They argue that they need to control for democracy, but their estimation procedure is equivalent to omitting democracy from their analysis. When we reestimate their regressions controlling for democracy, most of their important findings do not survive.

Suggested Citation

  • Clarke, Kevin A. & Stone, Randall W., 2008. "Democracy and the Logic of Political Survival," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 387-392, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:102:y:2008:i:03:p:387-392_08
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    Cited by:

    1. Oechslin, Manuel, 2014. "Targeting autocrats: Economic sanctions and regime change," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 24-40.
    2. Vuk Vukovic, 2017. "The political economy of local government in Croatia: winning coalitions, corruption, and taxes," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 41(4), pages 387-420.
    3. Moritz Heimes & Steffen Seemann, 2012. "Which Pay for what Performance? Evidence from Executive Compensation in Germany and the United States," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-29, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    4. Shu Yu & Richard Jong-A-Pin, 2016. "Political leader survival: does competence matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 113-142, January.
    5. William Akoto, 2022. "Accountability and cyber conflict: examining institutional constraints on the use of cyber proxies," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(3), pages 311-332, May.
    6. Huo, Jingjing, 2015. "How Nations Innovate: The Political Economy of Technological Innovation in Affluent Capitalist Economies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198735847.
    7. Chwieroth, Jeffrey & Walter, Andrew, 2015. "Great expectations, veto players, and the changing politics of banking crises," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60953, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Randall J. Blimes, 2011. "International Conflict and Leadership Tenure," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Eric Chang & Miriam A. Golden, 2010. "Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 91(1), pages 1-20, March.
    10. Seung-Whan Choi, 2010. "Legislative Constraints: A Path to Peace?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(3), pages 438-470, June.

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