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The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816–1985

Author

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  • Bennett, D. Scott
  • Stam, Allan C.

Abstract

We present a model of war duration which incorporates both realpolitik and domestic political variables. We hypothesize that strategy, terrain, capabilities, and government type, among other variables, will play key roles in determining the duration of war. We test these hypotheses using hazard analysis and find empirical support for our key arguments. We find that the realpolitik variables play a greater role than regime behavior and type in determining war duration. We also find that historically, on average, mobilization and strategic surprise have little effect on war duration and that wars are not duration dependent.

Suggested Citation

  • Bennett, D. Scott & Stam, Allan C., 1996. "The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816–1985," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(2), pages 239-257, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:02:p:239-257_20
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    Cited by:

    1. Nakao, Keisuke, 2022. "Democratic Victory and War Duration: Why Are Democracies Less Likely to Win Long Wars?," MPRA Paper 112849, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2009. "Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 191, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    3. Nakao, Keisuke, 2019. "Moving Forward vs. Inflicting Costs in a Random-Walk Model of War," MPRA Paper 96071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Sambuddha Ghosh & Gabriele Gratton & Caixia Shen, 2019. "Intimidation: Linking Negotiation And Conflict," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1589-1618, November.
    5. Nakao, Keisuke, 2017. "Denial vs. Punishment: Strategies Shape War, but War Itself Affects Strategies," MPRA Paper 81418, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Brian R Urlacher, 2021. "Introducing Native American Conflict History (NACH) data," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(5), pages 1117-1125, September.
    7. Agustín Goenaga & Oriol Sabaté & Jan Teorell, 2023. "The state does not live by warfare alone: War and revenue in the long nineteenth century," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 393-418, April.
    8. Susumu Suzuki & Volker Krause & J. David Singer, 2002. "The Correlates of War Project: a Bibliographic History of the Scientific Study of War and Peace, 1964-2000," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 19(2), pages 69-107, September.
    9. Keisuke Nakao, 2022. "Denial and punishment in war," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(2), pages 166-179, March.
    10. Randall J. Blimes, 2011. "International Conflict and Leadership Tenure," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Eric Min, 2021. "Interstate War Battle dataset (1823–2003)," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(2), pages 294-303, March.
    12. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2004. "Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 129, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    13. Gries Thomas & Haake Claus-Jochen, 2016. "Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War: Ideology and Beliefs, Indivisibles and Time Preferences," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 22(4), pages 377-384, December.
    14. Tobias Böhmelt, 2013. "Failing to succeed? The cumulative impact of international mediation revisited1," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(3), pages 199-219, July.
    15. Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli & Salvatore Nunnari, 2022. "A Theory of Power Wars," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 17(1), pages 1-30, January.
    16. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
    17. Carlos P. Barros & Luis A. Gil-Alana, 2011. "Terrorism: The Case of ETA," Chapters, in: Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Marco Nilsson, 2018. "Causal beliefs and war termination," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 55(1), pages 94-106, January.
    19. Fiona McGillivray & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(2), pages 154-172, April.
    20. Thomas Gries & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2016. "An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War'," Working Papers CIE 95, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    21. Chyanda Querido, 2007. "A Game Theoretic Approach of War," EcoMod2007 23900073, EcoMod.
    22. Gries, Thomas & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2016. "An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War' '- Compromise for Peace versus Conventional, Guerilla, or Terrorist Warfare," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145617, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    23. Richard Jordan, 2021. "Symbolic victories and strategic risk," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(5), pages 973-985, September.
    24. Nakao, Keisuke, 2019. "Modeling Deterrence by Denial and by Punishment," MPRA Paper 95100, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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