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Maher Said

Personal Details

First Name:Maher
Middle Name:
Last Name:Said
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psa458
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/faculty/bio/maher-said
Terminal Degree:2009 Economics Department; Yale University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Economics Department
Stern School of Business
New York University (NYU)

New York City, New York (United States)
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/
RePEc:edi:ednyuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Deb, Rahul & Pai, Mallesh & Said, Maher, 2023. "Indirect Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers 17955, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher & Pai, Mallesh, 2022. "Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17772, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2017. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," Working Papers 17-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  4. Rahul Deb & Maher Said, 2013. "Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment," Working Papers tecipa-485, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  5. Ralph Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2011. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," Working Papers 2011-5, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  6. Monte, Daniel & Said, Maher, 2010. "Learning in hidden Markov models with bounded memory," MPRA Paper 23854, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Jun 2010.
  7. Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000035, David K. Levine.
  8. Said, Maher, 2008. "Information Revelation and Random Entry in Sequential Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper 7160, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Said, Maher, 2008. "Dynamic Markets with Randomly Arriving Agents," MPRA Paper 9868, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2018. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(10), pages 3057-3103, October.
  2. Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher, 2015. "Dynamic screening with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 891-928.
  3. Daniel Monte & Maher Said, 2014. "The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 59-82, May.
  4. Raphael Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2013. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(1), pages 1-34.
  5. Said, Maher, 2012. "Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
  6. Said, Maher, 2011. "Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 236-243, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2017. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," Working Papers 17-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Cipullo, Davide & Reslow, André, 2019. "Biased Forecasts to Affect Voting Decisions? The Brexit Case," Working Paper Series 2019:4, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    2. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Tan Gan & Yingkai Li, 2023. "Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2372, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Pai, Mallesh & Deb, Rahul & Mitchell, Matthew, 2020. "(Bad) Reputation in Relational Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 14408, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Rahul Deb & Matthew Mitchell & Mallesh Pai, 2019. "Our distrust is very expensive," Working Papers tecipa-632, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    6. Fan Wu, 2024. "Incentivizing Information Acquisition," Papers 2410.13978, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    7. Dell’Era, Michele, 2020. "Talking to influence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    8. Yingkai Li & Jonathan Libgober, 2023. "Implementing Evidence Acquisition: Time Dependence in Contracts for Advice," Papers 2310.19147, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    9. Lukyanov, Georgy, 2023. "Reputation for competence in a cheap-talk setting," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 285-294.
    10. Rajiv Vohra & Francisco Espinosa & Debraj Ray, 2021. "A Principal-Agent Relationship with No Advantage to Commitment," Working Papers 2021-003, Brown University, Department of Economics.

  2. Rahul Deb & Maher Said, 2013. "Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment," Working Papers tecipa-485, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019. "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2189R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2020.
    2. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2013. "Ex post information rents and disclosure in sequential screening," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 406, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    3. David Martimort & Lars A. Stole, 2022. "Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03758833, HAL.
    4. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    5. Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2017. "Contracting with endogenous entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 85-110.
    6. Skreta, Vasiliki, 2015. "Optimal auction design under non-commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 854-890.
    7. Juan Beccuti & Marc Moeller, 2019. "Screening by Mode of Trade," Diskussionsschriften dp1908, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    8. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2015. "Ex post information rents in sequential screening," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 257-273.
    9. Tao Zhang & Quanyan Zhu, 2019. "On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment," Papers 1909.13720, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    10. Long Gao & Birendra K. Mishra, 2019. "The Role of Market Evolution in Channel Contracting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 2432-2441, May.
    11. Mettral, Thomas, 2018. "Deterministic versus Stochastic Contracts in a Dynamic Principal-Agent Model," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 93, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    12. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2021. "Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 310-328.
    13. Liu, Bin & Liu, Dongri & Lu, Jingfeng, 2020. "Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007)," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    14. Siqi Pan & Xin Zhao, 2023. "Commitment and cheap talk in search deterrence," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(2), pages 325-359, June.
    15. Akan, Mustafa & Ata, Barış & Dana, James D., 2015. "Revenue management by sequential screening," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 728-774.
    16. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2021. "Purchase history and product personalization," Papers 2103.11504, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    17. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2021. "Which is better for durable goods producers, exclusive or open supply chain?," ISER Discussion Paper 1115, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    18. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers 1904.07456, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    19. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment," Papers 1811.03579, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    20. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    21. Tao Zhang & Quanyan Zhu, 2022. "On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 701-745, June.
    22. Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Gabriel Y. Weintraub, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 711-730, May.
    23. Jeffrey C. Ely & Daniel F. Garrett & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2017. "Overbooking," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(6), pages 1258-1301.
    24. Garrett, Daniel F., 2023. "Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 161-170.
    25. Santiago R. Balseiro & Vahab S. Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme, 2018. "Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(11), pages 5062-5082, November.
    26. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Sequential versus Static Screening: an Equivalence Result," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 24, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    27. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Withers, John A., 2019. "Dynamic regulation revisited: Signal dampening, experimentation and the ratchet effect," DICE Discussion Papers 318, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    28. Francesco Giovannoni & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2022. "Pricing Novel Goods," Papers 2208.04985, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
    29. Boaz Zik, 2023. "Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(2), pages 567-590, February.
    30. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    31. Thomas Mettral, 2018. "Deterministic versus stochastic contracts in a dynamic principal-agent model," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(2), pages 209-218, October.
    32. Matteo Foschi, 2016. "Contracting with Type-Dependent Naïveté," Discussion Papers in Economics 16/03, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.

  3. Ralph Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2011. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," Working Papers 2011-5, University of Miami, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Arve, Malin & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2023. "Optimal procurement and investment in new technologies under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    2. Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 819-853.
    3. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2013. "Ex post information rents and disclosure in sequential screening," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 406, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    4. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    5. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2015. "Ex post information rents in sequential screening," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 257-273.
    6. Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2017. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," Working Papers 17-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    7. Litterscheid, Sina & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "Sequential, multidimensional screening," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100621, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Terstiege, Stefan, 2013. "Precontractual Investigation and Sequential Screening," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 429, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    9. Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2015. "Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(2), pages 762-790.
    10. Sergiu Ungureanu, 2017. "Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 667-692, August.
    11. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-497, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    12. Negin Golrezaei & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2017. "Auctions with Dynamic Costly Information Acquisition," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 130-144, February.
    13. Vahab Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme & Pingzhong Tang & Song Zuo, 2020. "Non‐Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 1939-1963, September.
    14. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    15. Negin Golrezaei & Hamid Nazerzadeh & Ramandeep Randhawa, 2020. "Dynamic Pricing for Heterogeneous Time-Sensitive Customers," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 22(3), pages 562-581, May.
    16. Andrzej Skrzypacz & Juuso Toikka, 2015. "Mechanisms for Repeated Trade," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 252-293, November.
    17. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2102, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    18. Krasikov, Ilia & Lamba, Rohit, 2021. "A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    19. Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher & Pai, Mallesh, 2022. "Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17772, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Jean Tirole, 2016. "From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening With Positive Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84(4), pages 1291-1343, July.
    21. Terstiege, Stefan, 2016. "Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 70-87.
    22. Rahul Deb & Maher Said, 2013. "Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment," Working Papers tecipa-485, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    23. Negin Golrezaei & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2017. "Auctions with Dynamic Costly Information Acquisition," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 130-144, February.
    24. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    25. Chifeng Dai, 2021. "Optimal sequential contract with a risk‐averse supplier," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 92-125, February.
    26. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.

  4. Monte, Daniel & Said, Maher, 2010. "Learning in hidden Markov models with bounded memory," MPRA Paper 23854, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Jun 2010.

    Cited by:

    1. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Guryev, Konstantin & Hu, Tai-Wei, 2022. "Bounded memory in a changing world: Biases in behaviour and belief," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Nick Netzer, 2015. "Robust stochastic stability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 31-57, January.
    3. Leung, B. T. K., 2020. "Learning in a Small/Big World," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2085, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Benson Tsz Kin Leung, 2020. "Learning in a Small/Big World," Papers 2009.11917, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    5. Mueller-Frank, Manuel, 2015. "Reaching Consensus in Social Networks," IESE Research Papers D/1116, IESE Business School.
    6. Tai-Wei Hu, 2023. "Forgetful updating and stubborn decision-makers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 781-802, April.

  5. Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000035, David K. Levine.

    Cited by:

    1. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-853, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    2. Kiho Yoon, 2015. "On Budget Balance of the Dynamic Pivot Mechanism," Discussion Paper Series 1501, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    3. Battaglini, Marco & Lamba, Rohit, 2019. "Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    4. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011. "Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-826, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    6. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-497, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    7. Deepanshu Vasal, 2022. "Master equation of discrete-time Stackelberg mean field games with multiple leaders," Papers 2209.03186, arXiv.org.
    8. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    9. Babaioff, Moshe & Blumrosen, Liad & Roth, Aaron, 2015. "Auctions with online supply," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 227-246.
    10. Kartikeya Puranam & Michael Katehakis, 2014. "On optimal bidding and inventory control in sequential procurement auctions: the multi period case," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 217(1), pages 447-462, June.
    11. Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    12. Deepanshu Vasal & Randall Berry, 2022. "Master Equation for Discrete-Time Stackelberg Mean Field Games with single leader," Papers 2201.05959, arXiv.org.
    13. Katehakis, Michael N. & Puranam, Kartikeya S., 2012. "On bidding for a fixed number of items in a sequence of auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 76-84.
    14. Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Gabriel Y. Weintraub, 2012. "Auctions for Online Display Advertising Exchanges: Approximations and Design," Working Papers 12-11, NET Institute.
    15. Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2017. "Repeated Nash implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.

  6. Said, Maher, 2008. "Information Revelation and Random Entry in Sequential Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper 7160, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1757, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Vahab Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme & Pingzhong Tang & Song Zuo, 2020. "Non‐Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 1939-1963, September.
    5. Said, Maher, 2011. "Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 236-243, September.

  7. Said, Maher, 2008. "Dynamic Markets with Randomly Arriving Agents," MPRA Paper 9868, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Liu Shulin & Han Xiaohu, 2018. "Sequential First-Price Auction with Randomly Arriving Buyers," Journal of Systems Science and Information, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 29-34, February.
    2. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    4. Salant, David J. & Cabral, Luís, 2019. "Sequential auctions and auction revenue," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 1-4.
    5. Hummel, Patrick, 2015. "Simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 269-284.
    6. Joosung Lee & Daniel Z. Li, 2018. "Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline," Department of Economics Working Papers 2018_03, Durham University, Department of Economics.
    7. Mingrong Wang & Mingxi Wang & Lihua Lang, 2017. "Reconsidering Carbon Permits Auction Mechanism: An Efficient Dynamic Model," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(8), pages 1624-1645, August.
    8. Pownall, Rachel A.J. & Wolk, Leonard, 2013. "Bidding behavior and experience in internet auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 14-27.
    9. Vadovič, Radovan, 2017. "Bidding behavior and price search in Internet auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 125-147.
    10. Thomas D. Jeitschko & Pallavi Pal, 2021. "Curbing Price Fluctuations in Cap-and-Trade Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 9266, CESifo.
    11. Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "Prices versus auctions in large markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1297-1337, November.
    12. Francesc Dilmé, 2022. "Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 193, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    13. Dominic Coey & Bradley J. Larsen & Brennan C. Platt, 2020. "Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(12), pages 3748-3785, December.
    14. Budde, Maximilian & Minner, Stefan, 2015. "Optimal capacity provision for service providers with subsequent auctioning of projects," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 170(PB), pages 652-662.
    15. Bryan Lim, 2010. "The Case for Last-Second Bidding," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000343, David K. Levine.
    16. Kenneth Hendricks & Thomas Wiseman, 2021. "How To Sell (or Procure) in a Sequential Auction," Papers 2110.13121, arXiv.org.
    17. Dennis Clerck & Erik Demeulemeester, 2016. "A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 38(2), pages 427-457, March.
    18. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    19. Amir Ban & Ron Lavi, 2021. "Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 75-104, March.

  8. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Hamid Nazerzadeh & Amin Saberi & Rakesh Vohra, 2013. "Dynamic Pay-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(1), pages 98-111, February.
    2. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2008. "The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1672R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2009.
    4. Salant, David J. & Cabral, Luís, 2019. "Sequential auctions and auction revenue," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 1-4.
    5. Sano, Ryuji, 2021. "Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 465-473.
    6. Yiwei Chen & Vivek F. Farias & Nikolaos Trichakis, 2019. "On the Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of Strategic Customers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(12), pages 5535-5555, December.
    7. Hummel, Patrick, 2015. "Simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 269-284.
    8. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    9. Tao Zhang & Quanyan Zhu, 2019. "On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment," Papers 1909.13720, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    10. Yiwei Chen & Nikolaos Trichakis, 2021. "Technical Note—On Revenue Management with Strategic Customers Choosing When and What to Buy," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 175-187, January.
    11. Joosung Lee & Daniel Z. Li, 2018. "Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline," Department of Economics Working Papers 2018_03, Durham University, Department of Economics.
    12. Ryuji Sano, 2015. "A Dynamic Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Different Use Lengths," KIER Working Papers 924, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    13. Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1757, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    14. Sham M. Kakade & Ilan Lobel & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2013. "Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(4), pages 837-854, August.
    15. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    16. Yiwei Chen & Vivek F. Farias, 2018. "Robust Dynamic Pricing with Strategic Customers," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 43(4), pages 1119-1142, November.
    17. Thomas D. Jeitschko & Pallavi Pal, 2021. "Curbing Price Fluctuations in Cap-and-Trade Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 9266, CESifo.
    18. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2017. "Calendar mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 252-270.
    19. Ryuji Sano, 2017. "A Dynamic Mechanism Design with Overbooking, Different Deadlines, and Multi-unit Demands," KIER Working Papers 963, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    20. Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "Prices versus auctions in large markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1297-1337, November.
    21. Vahab Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme & Pingzhong Tang & Song Zuo, 2020. "Non‐Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 1939-1963, September.
    22. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Monotone Contracts," Working Papers 1085, Barcelona School of Economics.
    23. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    24. Tao Zhang & Quanyan Zhu, 2022. "On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 701-745, June.
    25. Jeffrey C. Ely & Daniel F. Garrett & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2017. "Overbooking," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(6), pages 1258-1301.
    26. Andrzej Skrzypacz & Simon Board, 2011. "Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers," 2011 Meeting Papers 87, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    27. Rahul Deb & Maher Said, 2013. "Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment," Working Papers tecipa-485, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    28. Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    29. Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 45-76.
    30. Ron Lavi & Ella Segev, 2014. "Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 791-819, November.
    31. Emil Temnyalov, 2019. "Points mechanisms and rewards programs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 436-457, June.
    32. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2018. "Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(5), pages 2031-2046, May.

Articles

  1. Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2018. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(10), pages 3057-3103, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher, 2015. "Dynamic screening with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 891-928.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Daniel Monte & Maher Said, 2014. "The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 59-82, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Raphael Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2013. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(1), pages 1-34.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Said, Maher, 2012. "Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Said, Maher, 2011. "Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 236-243, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 10 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (8) 2008-02-23 2008-08-14 2008-11-25 2010-03-28 2010-05-22 2011-09-16 2013-05-22 2019-05-06. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (6) 2008-08-14 2008-11-25 2011-09-16 2013-05-22 2017-02-26 2019-05-06. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2008-02-23 2008-08-14 2008-11-25 2010-05-22
  4. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2008-02-23 2013-05-22
  5. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (2) 2010-07-24 2011-09-16
  6. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2019-05-06
  7. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (1) 2008-08-14
  8. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2019-05-06

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