Mechanisms for Repeated Trade
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Abstract
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140173
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References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
- repec:cwl:cwldpp:1953rrr is not listed on IDEAS
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- Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018.
"Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
- Juan F. Escobar & Gastón Llanes, 2015. "Cooperation Dynamic in Repeated Games of Adverse Selection," Documentos de Trabajo 311, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Loertscher, Simon & Muir, Ellen V. & Taylor, Peter G., 2022. "Optimal market thickness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
- Bergemann, Dirk & V�lim�ki, Juuso, 2017.
"Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
12240, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 3002, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Marco Buso & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2023. "Taxation of Public Franchises with Persistent Demand Shocks," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0306, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
- Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2015.
"Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 819-853.
- Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2014. "Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1953R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 2014.
- Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2015. "Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001080, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2014. "Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1953R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2015.
- Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2014. "Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1953, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2014. "Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1953R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2015.
- Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher, 2015.
"Dynamic screening with limited commitment,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 891-928.
- Rahul Deb & Maher Said, 2013. "Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment," Working Papers tecipa-485, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2019.
"Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(2), pages 235-274, June.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Välimäki, Juuso, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," CEPR Discussion Papers 12240, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2102, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2102R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2018.
- Garrett, Daniel F., 2023. "Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 161-170.
- Yoon, Kiho, 2015.
"On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 206-213.
- Kiho Yoon, 2015. "On Budget Balance of the Dynamic Pivot Mechanism," Discussion Paper Series 1501, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Kiho Yoon, 2021.
"The Uniqueness of Dynamic Groves Mechanisms on Restricted Domains,"
Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 37, pages 263-285.
- Kiho Yoon, 2020. "The uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms on restricted domains," Discussion Paper Series 2004, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Kiho Yoon, 2020. "The uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms on restricted domains," Papers 2006.14190, arXiv.org.
- Garrett, Daniel F., 2017.
"Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
- Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values," TSE Working Papers 17-830, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
- Marco Buso & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2018.
"Termination Fees and Contract Design in Public-Private Partnerships,"
"Marco Fanno" Working Papers
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- Rosella Levaggi & Michele Moretto & Paolo Pertile, 2023.
"Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services,"
Working Papers
2023.16, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Levaggi, Rosella & Moretto, Michele & Pertile, Paolo, 2023. "Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services," FEEM Working Papers 338404, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Buso, Marco & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2023.
"Dynamic Regulation of Public Franchises with Imperfectly Correlated Demand Shocks,"
FEEM Working Papers
330499, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Marco Buso & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2023. "Dynamic Regulation of Public Franchises with Imperfectly Correlated Demand Shocks," Working Papers 2023.03, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Rohit Lamba, 2022. "Efficiency with(out) intermediation in repeated bilateral trade," Papers 2202.04201, arXiv.org.
- Rohit Lamba & Ilia Krasikov, 2017. "A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints," 2017 Meeting Papers 1544, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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