IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cwl/cwldpp/2372.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules

Author

Listed:
  • Dirk Bergemann

    (Yale University)

  • Tan Gan

    (Yale University)

  • Yingkai Li

    (Yale University)

Abstract

We study a sender-receiver model where the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. The decision rule can depend on the signal structure and the signal realization that the sender adopts. This framework captures applications where a decision-maker (the receiver) solicit advice from an interested party (sender). In these applications, the receiver faces uncertainty regarding the senderÕs preferences and the set of feasible signal structures. Consequently, we adopt a unified robust analysis framework that includes max-min utility, min-max regret, and min-max approximation ratio as special cases. We show that it is optimal for the receiver to sacrifice ex-post optimality to perfectly align the senderÕs incentive. The optimal decision rule is a quota rule, i.e., the decision rule maximizes the receiverÕs ex-ante payoff subject to the constraint that the marginal distribution over actions adheres to a consistent quota, regardless of the senderÕs chosen signal structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Bergemann & Tan Gan & Yingkai Li, 2023. "Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2372, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2372
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2023-10/d2372.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stoye, Jörg, 2011. "Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2226-2251.
    2. Mario Ghossoub & David Saunders, 2021. "On the continuity of the feasible set mapping in optimal transport," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(1), pages 113-117, April.
    3. Laux, Christian, 2001. "Limited-Liability and Incentive Contracting with Multiple Projects," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 514-526, Autumn.
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2012. "Robust Monopoly Pricing," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 13, pages 417-441, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Benjamin Brooks & Songzi Du, 2021. "Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1313-1360, May.
    6. Chakraborty, Archishman & Harbaugh, Rick, 2007. "Comparative cheap talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 70-94, January.
      • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2004. "Comparative Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2004-08, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    7. Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2018. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(10), pages 3057-3103, October.
    8. Geoffroy de Clippel & Xu Zhang, 2022. "Non-Bayesian Persuasion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(10), pages 2594-2642.
    9. Chen, Bo, 2012. "All-or-nothing payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 133-142.
    10. Carroll, Gabriel, 2019. "Robust incentives for information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 382-420.
    11. Matthew O Jackson & Hugo F Sonnenschein, 2007. "Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 241-257, January.
    12. Jason D. Hartline & Brendan Lucier, 2015. "Non-optimal Mechanism Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(10), pages 3102-3124, October.
    13. Gabriel Carroll, 2017. "Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 453-488, March.
    14. Amine Allouah & Omar Besbes, 2020. "Prior-Independent Optimal Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(10), pages 4417-4432, October.
    15. Jerry Anunrojwong & Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes, 2023. "Robust Auction Design with Support Information," Papers 2305.09065, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2025.
    16. Carmen Beviá & Luis Corchón, 2022. "Contests with dominant strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1-19, November.
    17. Piotr Dworczak & Alessandro Pavan, 2022. "Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2017-2051, September.
    18. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Ziheng & Lu, Qinan, 2023. "Ozone stress and crop harvesting failure: Evidence from US food production," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors," Papers 2204.13726, arXiv.org.
    2. Shixin Wang, 2024. "Semi-Separable Mechanisms in Multi-Item Robust Screening," Papers 2408.13580, arXiv.org.
    3. Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2010. "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 34-63, May.
    4. Yeon-Koo Che & Weijie Zhong, 2021. "Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods," Papers 2105.02828, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
    5. Casella, Alessandra, 2011. "Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 46-76, May.
    6. Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler, 2021. "Persuasion with Ambiguous Receiver Preferences," Papers 2109.11536, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    7. Shixin Wang, 2023. "The Power of Simple Menus in Robust Selling Mechanisms," Papers 2310.17392, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    8. Persson, Petra, 2018. "Attention manipulation and information overload," Behavioural Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 78-106, May.
    9. Jindapon, Paan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2013. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 111-125.
    10. Tommaso Denti & Doron Ravid, 2023. "Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention," Papers 2306.09964, arXiv.org.
    11. Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    12. Çağıl Koçyiğit & Daniel Kuhn & Napat Rujeerapaiboon, 2024. "Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder, Multi-Item Auctions," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 36(6), pages 1543-1561, December.
    13. Hoffmann, Robert & Chesney, Thomas & Chuah, Swee-Hoon & Kock, Florian & Larner, Jeremy, 2020. "Demonstrability, difficulty and persuasion: An experimental study of advice taking," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    14. Li, Zhuozheng & Rantakari, Heikki & Yang, Huanxing, 2016. "Competitive cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 65-89.
    15. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
    16. Dirk Bergemann & Karl H. Schlag, 2012. "Pricing Without Priors," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 12, pages 405-415, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    17. Vinicius Carrasco & Vitor Farinha Luz & Paulo K. Monteiro & Humberto Moreira, 2019. "Robust mechanisms: the curvature case," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 203-222, July.
    18. Gong, Qiang & Yang, Huanxing, 2021. "Cheap talk about the relevance of multiple aspects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    19. Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "Smooth, strategic communication," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100333, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    20. Wonsuk Chung & Rick Harbaugh, 2012. "Biased Recommendations," Working Papers 2012-02, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2372. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Brittany Ladd (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cowleus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.