Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0552-8
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More about this item
Keywords
Asymmetric information; Dynamic contracting; Mechanism design; Information structure;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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