Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0405-7
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Peter Cramton, 2013.
"Spectrum Auction Design,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, March.
- Peter Cramton, 2009. "Spectrum Auction Design," Papers of Peter Cramton 09sad, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso V‰lim‰ki, 2010.
"The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 771-789, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2008. "The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1672, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2008. "The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1672R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2009.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2008. "The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002340, David K. Levine.
- Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2010. "Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 144-154, January.
- Mallesh Pai & Rakesh Vohra, 2008. "Optimal Dynamic Auctions," Discussion Papers 1461, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- R. Preston McAfee, 2002. "Coarse Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 2025-2034, September.
- Paul Klemperer (ed.), 2000. "The Economic Theory of Auctions," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 1669.
- Said, Maher, 2012.
"Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
- Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ye, Lixin, 2007. "Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 181-207, January.
- Jérémie Gallien, 2006. "Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 54(2), pages 291-310, April.
- Neeman, Zvika, 2003. "The effectiveness of English auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 214-238, May.
- Susan Athey & Ilya Segal, 2013.
"An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2463-2485, November.
- Susan Athey & Ilya Segal, 2007. "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001134, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December.
- Gustavo Vulcano & Garrett van Ryzin & Costis Maglaras, 2002.
"Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Revenue Management,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(11), pages 1388-1407, November.
- Gustavo Vulcano & Garrett van Ryzin & Costis Maglaras, 2002. "Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Revenue Management," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 4(1), pages 7-11.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Patrick Hummel, 2018. "Reserve prices in repeated auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 273-299, March.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Said, Maher, 2012.
"Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
- Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tao Zhang & Quanyan Zhu, 2019. "On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment," Papers 1909.13720, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
- Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010.
"Dynamic Auctions: A Survey,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000035, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1757, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000111, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1757R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2010.
- Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015.
"Advances in Auctions,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,,
Elsevier.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Kaplan, Todd R & Zamir, Shmuel, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," MPRA Paper 54656, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Sham M. Kakade & Ilan Lobel & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2013. "Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(4), pages 837-854, August.
- Hamid Nazerzadeh & Amin Saberi & Rakesh Vohra, 2013. "Dynamic Pay-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(1), pages 98-111, February.
- Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2018. "Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(5), pages 2031-2046, May.
- Tao Zhang & Quanyan Zhu, 2022. "On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 701-745, June.
- Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2017.
"Calendar mechanisms,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 252-270.
- Toomas Hinnosaar, 2013. "Calendar mechanisms," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 304, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Yiwei Chen & Vivek F. Farias, 2018. "Robust Dynamic Pricing with Strategic Customers," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 43(4), pages 1119-1142, November.
- Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
- Vahab Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme & Pingzhong Tang & Song Zuo, 2020. "Non‐Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 1939-1963, September.
- Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 45-76.
- Yiwei Chen & Nikolaos Trichakis, 2021. "Technical Note—On Revenue Management with Strategic Customers Choosing When and What to Buy," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 175-187, January.
- Daley, Brendan & Schwarz, Michael & Sonin, Konstantin, 2012. "Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 104-119.
- Mierendorff, Konrad, 2016. "Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 190-222.
- Yiwei Chen & Vivek F. Farias & Nikolaos Trichakis, 2019. "On the Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of Strategic Customers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(12), pages 5535-5555, December.
- Aristotelis Boukouras & Kostas Koufopoulos, 2017. "Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(1), pages 75-98, June.
- Mallesh M. Pai & Rakesh Vohra, 2013. "Optimal Dynamic Auctions and Simple Index Rules," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 38(4), pages 682-697, November.
- Thomas D. Jeitschko & Pallavi Pal, 2021.
"Curbing Price Fluctuations in Cap-and-Trade Auctions,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
9266, CESifo.
- Thomas D. Jeitschko & Pallavi Pal, 2022. "Curbing Price Fluctuations in Cap-and-Trade Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 9978, CESifo.
More about this item
Keywords
Sequential ascending auctions; Undominated strategies ; Dynamic arrivals; C72;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:4:p:791-819. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.