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The institutions of international treaty organizations as evidence for social contract theory

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  • Congleton, Roger D.

Abstract

Treaty organizations are formed via voluntary contracts among national governments that address policy issues of mutual concern. As such, treaty organizations provide evidence about the kinds of institutions that might be adopted via social contract. This paper develops a theory of the design of treaty organizations and examines the domains of authority and decision-making procedures of 22 treaty organizations to determine if any general traits are in evidence. It turns out that most treaty organizations rely upon unanimity or supermajorities for their major decisions and usually have quite narrow (bounded) policy domains.

Suggested Citation

  • Congleton, Roger D., 2020. "The institutions of international treaty organizations as evidence for social contract theory," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0176268020300392
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101891
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Roger D. Congleton, 2019. "Fiscal Bargaining and the Implicit Fiscal Constitutions of Liberal Democracies: A Public Choice Perspective," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 15(2), pages 175-198, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roger D. Congleton, 2020. "Ethics and good governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 379-398, September.
    2. Evgeny V. Balatsky & Natalia A. Ekimova, 2022. "Social Contract Phenomenon: Evolution of Concepts and Modern Interpretations," Journal of Applied Economic Research, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Ural Federal University, vol. 21(3), pages 604-636.
    3. Barbara Dluhosch & Daniel Horgos, 2024. "Clubbing in trade policies: How much a threat to the multilateral constitution?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 461-481, December.
    4. Zhuo Wenjun, 2023. "Circulation Expectations, Farmer Trust, and Farmers’ Contract Choice Behavior," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-15, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social contracts; Treaty organizations; Treaties; Trust; Unanimity; Bounded policy domains;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy

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