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Help, harm or avoid? On the personal advantage of dispositions to cooperate and punish in multilateral PD games with exit

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  • Congleton, Roger D.
  • Vanberg, Viktor J.

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  • Congleton, Roger D. & Vanberg, Viktor J., 2001. "Help, harm or avoid? On the personal advantage of dispositions to cooperate and punish in multilateral PD games with exit," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 145-167, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:44:y:2001:i:2:p:145-167
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    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    2. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory]," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 1941-1941, December.
    3. Axelrod, Robert, 1986. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1095-1111, December.
    4. repec:bla:kyklos:v:39:y:1986:i:2:p:245-66 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Vanberg, Viktor J. & Congleton, Roger D., 1992. "Rationality, Morality, and Exit," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 418-431, June.
    6. Rubin, Paul H., 1982. "Evolved ethics and efficient ethics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2-3), pages 161-174.
    7. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
    8. Congleton, Roger D., 1991. "The economic role of a work ethic," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 365-385, May.
    9. Roger D. Congleton, 1989. "Efficient Status Seeking: Externalities, and the Evolution of Status Games," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 697-712, Springer.
    10. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    11. Nalbantian, Haig R & Schotter, Andrew, 1997. "Productivity under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 314-341, June.
    12. Simon, Herbert A, 1979. "Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 493-513, September.
    13. Cooper, Russell & DeJong, Douglas V. & Forsythe, Robert & Ross, Thomas W., 1996. "Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 187-218, February.
    14. Andreoni, James A & Miller, John H, 1993. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(418), pages 570-585, May.
    15. Hirshlifer, David & Rassmusen, Eric, 1989. "Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, August.
    16. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    17. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1347-1374, September.
    18. Ulrich Witt, 1986. "Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 245-266, May.
    19. Juan Carlos Martinez Coll & Jack Hirshleifer, 1991. "The Limits of Reciprocity," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(1), pages 35-64, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Max Albert & Werner Güth & Erich Kirchler & Boris Maciejovsky, 2007. "Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(1), pages 53-69, March.
    2. Roger D. Congleton, 2020. "Governance by true believers: supreme duties with and without totalitarianism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 111-141, March.
    3. Viktor J. Vanberg, 2013. "Cooperation in multilateral PDs: self-selected vs pre-defined groups," Chapters, in: Francisco Cabrillo & Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro (ed.), Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions, chapter 15, pages 279-296, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Roger D. Congleton, 2002. "The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory, by Hirshleifer, J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 366 pp., USD 90|GBP 60 (cloth); USD 29.95|GBP 20.95 (paper)," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(3), pages 145-147.
    5. Roger D. Congleton, 2020. "Ethics and good governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 379-398, September.
    6. Heiner, Ronald Asher, 2002. "Robust Evolution Of Contingent Cooperation In Pure One-Shot Prisoners' Dilemmas. Part I: Vulnerable Contingent Participators Versus Stable Contingent Cooperators," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-09, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    7. Roger D. Congleton, 2018. "Toward a Rule-Based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus," Working Papers 18-09, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    8. Matti Vuorensyrjä, 2019. "A decentralized cooperative solution to the iterated pacifist’s dilemma game: notes in the margin of Pinker’s theory of Leviathan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 235-260, June.
    9. Roger D. Congleton, 2015. "On the Evolution of Organizational Governance: Divided Governance and Survival in the Long Run," Working Papers 15-25, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    10. Daniel Houser & Robert Kurzban, 2003. "Conditional cooperation and group dynamics: Experimental evidence from a sequential public goods game," Experimental 0307001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 21 Jan 2005.
    11. Deegen, Peter, 2016. "Private and public timber production: How markets and political institutions matter," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 56-65.
    12. Kalle Pajunen, 2006. "Living in Agreement with a Contract: The Management of Moral and Viable Firm–Stakeholder Relationships," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 68(3), pages 243-258, October.

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