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Governance by true believers: supreme duties with and without totalitarianism

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  • Roger D. Congleton

    (West Virginia University)

Abstract

This paper analyzes how governance by true believers differs from that by ordinary idealists and pragmatists. To do so, the paper develops a semi-lexicographic framework for analyzing behavior of persons who have internalized belief systems with “supreme” duties. It uses that framework to analyze the extent to which such duties tend to affect private behavior and demands for public policies. Bernholz’s research on totalitarian systems demonstrates that many of the least attractive governments in human history have been motivated by totalitarian belief systems. This paper agrees with that conclusion but suggests that many other results are also possible and that some of the most attractive governments in human history also have been motivated by belief systems with supreme duties.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger D. Congleton, 2020. "Governance by true believers: supreme duties with and without totalitarianism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 111-141, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:31:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-020-09300-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-020-09300-y
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    Cited by:

    1. Gutmann, Jerg & Metelska-Szaniawska, Katarzyna & Voigt, Stefan, 2024. "Leader characteristics and constitutional compliance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    2. Thomas Baumert, 2021. "Peter Bernholz’s: Totalitarianism, terrorism and supreme values: history and theory (Springer, 2017)," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 266-271, June.
    3. İpek Çınar, 2021. "Riding the democracy train: incumbent-led paths to autocracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 301-325, September.
    4. Roger D. Congleton, 2023. "Federalism and pandemic policies: variety as the spice of life," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 73-100, April.
    5. Roger D. Congleton, 2023. "Grounding multidisciplinary public policy analysis in methodological individualism: with an illustrating study of the economic and political effects of variations in a nation’s average work ethic," International Journal of Economic Policy Studies, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 351-383, August.
    6. Mario Ferrero, 2024. "Left, right, or neither? Islamism as social blueprint," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 500-522, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Supreme values; Supreme duties; Governing institutions; Totalitarianism; Political theory; Semi-lexicographic utility functions; Deontology; Constitutional constraints; Liberalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • O21 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Planning Models; Planning Policy
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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