IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/kyklos/v77y2024i1p3-21.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal taxation for democracies with less than perfect voters: A public choice perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Roger D. Congleton

Abstract

This paper analyzes optimal tax policy from the perspective of voters who want public policies to systematically advance their interests. Self‐acknowledged ignorance implies that voters have a practical interest in transparent and stable tax systems that allow personal tax burdens to be calculated accurately and easily. Such properties reduce voter mistakes. However, a voter's normative interests may conflict with these practical interests, because ideas about a good life or good society often support tax system complexity. Tradeoffs between these two aims of democratic tax systems imply that the optimal tax system for a democracy neither minimizes voter errors nor maximizes a social welfare function.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger D. Congleton, 2024. "Optimal taxation for democracies with less than perfect voters: A public choice perspective," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(1), pages 3-21, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:77:y:2024:i:1:p:3-21
    DOI: 10.1111/kykl.12356
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12356
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/kykl.12356?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Besley, Timothy J. & Rosen, Harvey S., 1999. "Sales Taxes and Prices: An Empirical Analysis," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 157-178, June.
    2. Tideman, T Nicolaus & Tullock, Gordon, 1976. "A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1145-1159, December.
    3. Kirchler, Erich & Hoelzl, Erik & Wahl, Ingrid, 2008. "Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The "slippery slope" framework," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 210-225, April.
    4. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    5. Niklas Potrafke, 2018. "Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States—a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 145-207, January.
    6. Emmanuel Farhi & Iván Werning, 2013. "Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 489-495, May.
    7. Jorgenson, Dale W & Yun, Kun-Young, 1990. "Tax Reform and U.S. Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 151-193, October.
    8. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2002. "Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 87-99, July.
    9. Roger Congleton, 2007. "Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 333-352, September.
    10. Slemrod, Joel, 1990. "Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 157-178, Winter.
    11. Oswald, Andrew J., 1983. "Altruism, jealousy and the theory of optimal non-linear taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 77-87, February.
    12. Eichenberger, Reiner & Serna, Angel, 1996. "Random Errors, Dirty Information, and Politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 86(1-2), pages 137-156, January.
    13. Werner W. Pommerehne & Friedrich Schneider*, 1978. "Fiscal Illusion, Political Institutions, And Local Public Spending," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 381-408, August.
    14. Roger Congleton, 2001. "Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 35-64, April.
    15. T. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2005. "Fair and Efficient Compensation for Taking Property under Uncertainty," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(3), pages 471-495, August.
    16. Carbonnier, Clement, 2007. "Who pays sales taxes? Evidence from French VAT reforms, 1987-1999," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 1219-1229, June.
    17. Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 2006. "Politics by Principle, Not Interest," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521031325, November.
    18. Ángel Melguizo & José González-Páramo, 2013. "Who bears labour taxes and social contributions? A meta-analysis approach," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 247-271, August.
    19. Congleton, Roger D. & Tollison, Robert D., 1999. "The stability inducing propensities of very unstable coalitions: avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent-seeking," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 193-205, June.
    20. Roger D. Congleton, 1997. "Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 485-505, November.
    21. Reiner Eichenberger & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 1998. "Rational moralists: The role of fairness in democratic economic politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 191-210, January.
    22. Roger D. Congleton, 2020. "Ethics and good governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 379-398, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Roger Congleton, 2014. "The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-67, March.
    2. Roger D. Congleton, 2023. "Federalism and pandemic policies: variety as the spice of life," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 73-100, April.
    3. Shigeharu Okajima & Taro Shinoda & Yukihiko Funaki & Hiroko Okajima, 2025. "The Impact of Earmarked Taxes on Supply Curve Shifts: A Laboratory Experiment," Working Papers 2410, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    4. Haan, Peter & Simmler, Martin, 2018. "Wind electricity subsidies — A windfall for landowners? Evidence from a feed-in tariff in Germany," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 16-32.
    5. Franz W. Wagner & Stefan Weber, 2016. "Wird die Umsatzsteuer überwälzt? [Do Firms Pass on VAT?]," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 401-421, December.
    6. Andrej Cupák & Peter Tóth, 2017. "Measuring the Efficiency of VAT reforms: Evidence from Slovakia," Working and Discussion Papers WP 6/2017, Research Department, National Bank of Slovakia.
    7. Panayiota Lyssiotou & Elena Savva, 2021. "Who pays taxes on basic foodstuffs? Evidence from broadening the VAT base," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(1), pages 212-247, February.
    8. Arkadiusz Bernal, 2018. "The Value Added Tax Incidence – the Case of the Book Market in CEE Countries," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 68(2), pages 144-164, April.
    9. Dora Benedek & Ruud A. Mooij & Michael Keen & Philippe Wingender, 2020. "Varieties of VAT pass through," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(4), pages 890-930, August.
    10. Kahl, Mats Petter, 2024. "Was the German fuel discount passed on to consumers?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    11. Clément Carbonnier, 2011. "Shifting on prices of per unit and ad valorem consumption taxes, estimation on prices of alcoholic beverages in France," THEMA Working Papers 2011-20, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    12. Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2008. "Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation," Discussion Papers 08-21, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    13. Asatryan, Zareh & Gomtsyan, David, 2020. "The incidence of VAT evasion," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-027, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    14. Lars-H. R. Siemers, 2014. "A General Microsimulation Model for the EU VAT with a specific Application to Germany," International Journal of Microsimulation, International Microsimulation Association, vol. 7(2), pages 40-93.
    15. Clément Carbonnier, 2011. "Shifting on prices of per unit and ad valorem consumption taxes," Working Papers halshs-00872477, HAL.
    16. Richard Blundell, 2009. "Assessing the Temporary VAT Cut Policy in the UK," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(1), pages 31-38, March.
    17. Peter J. Boettke & Henry A. Thompson, 2022. "Identity and off-diagonals: how permanent winning coalitions destroy democratic governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 483-499, June.
    18. Dong, Changgui & Wiser, Ryan & Rai, Varun, 2018. "Incentive pass-through for residential solar systems in California," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 154-165.
    19. Ricardo Batista Politi & Enlinson Mattos, 2011. "Ad-valorem tax incidence and after-tax price adjustments: evidence from Brazilian basic basket food," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(4), pages 1438-1470, November.
    20. Peter Haan & Martin Simmler, 2016. "Wind Electricity Subsidies = Windfall Gains for Land Owners? Evidence from Feed-In Tariff in Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1568, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:77:y:2024:i:1:p:3-21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.