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Ethics and good governance

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  • Roger D. Congleton

    (West Virginia University)

Abstract

Public choice research has revealed a variety of political dilemmas associated with governance that tend to make good governance unlikely. This paper suggests that the good governments that we observe are likely to have cultural or ethical support–support that solves or ameliorates the dilemmas uncovered by public choice research. It demonstrates that five important impediments to good governance can be ameliorated by internalized ethical dispositions. Although good government is not generated by ethical conduct per se, some forms of conduct regarded as ethical are supportive of good governance and arguably prerequisites to it.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger D. Congleton, 2020. "Ethics and good governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 379-398, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:184:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-020-00824-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00824-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Roger D. Congleton, 2023. "Federalism and pandemic policies: variety as the spice of life," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 73-100, April.
    2. İpek Çınar, 2021. "Riding the democracy train: incumbent-led paths to autocracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 301-325, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ethical dispositions; Good government; Political dilemmas; Cycling problems; Corruption; Sustaining democracy; Mystery of democracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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