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Pierre Chaigneau

Personal Details

First Name:Pierre
Middle Name:
Last Name:Chaigneau
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pch1493
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/view/pierrechaigneau
Terminal Degree:2010 London School of Economics (LSE) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

School of Business
Queen's University

Kingston, Canada
http://business.queensu.ca/
RePEc:edi:sbqueca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Pierre Chaigneau & Woo-Jin Chang & Stephen A. Hillegeist, 2024. "Performance measure skewness and the structure of CEO compensation : Theory and evidence," Post-Print hal-04625226, HAL.
  2. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2024. "Executive Compensation with Social and Environmental Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 18909, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2023. "Capital Structure with Information about the Upside and the Downside," MPRA Paper 121397, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex, 2023. "A Theory of Fair CEO Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 17782, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Edmans, Alex & Chaigneau, Pierre & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2021. "How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Sahuguet, Nicolas & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2021. "The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 15625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019. "The informativeness principle without the first-order approach," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102226, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  8. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102227, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  9. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2017. "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Post-Print halshs-02292785, HAL.
  10. Chaigneau, Pierre & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 2016. "Downside risk neutral probabilities," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118980, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  11. Edmans, Alex & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014. "The Generalized Informativeness Principle," CEPR Discussion Papers 10279, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014. "The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 10143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2014. "Explaining the Association between Monitoring and Controversial CEO Pay Practices: an Optimal Contracting Perspective," Cahiers de recherche 1406, CIRPEE.
  14. Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014. "The Value of Informativeness for Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 10180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2013. "The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 55405, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  16. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2012. "Pay-for-Luck in CEO Compensation: Matching and Efficient Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1224, CIRPEE.
  17. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2012. "The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119055, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  18. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2012. "The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119040, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  19. Bouvard, Matthieu & Chaigneau, Pierre & Motta, Adolfo, 2012. "Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119052, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  20. Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation," Cahiers de recherche 1207, CIRPEE.
  21. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2011. "Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119059, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  22. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2010. "Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119086, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  23. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2010. "The optimal timing of executive compensation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119081, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

Articles

  1. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2023. "The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 141-185, March.
  2. Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2022. "How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(1), pages 168-206.
  3. Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2020. "Downside risk-neutral probabilities," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 65-77, April.
  4. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019. "The informativeness principle without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 743-755.
  5. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2018. "The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 1297-1339, June.
  6. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
  7. Pierre Chaigneau, 2018. "Managerial Compensation and Firm Value in the Presence of Socially Responsible Investors," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 747-768, May.
  8. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2018. "The optimal timing of CEO compensation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 90-94.
  9. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2017. "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 14-16.
  10. Pierre Chaigneau, 2015. "Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(15), pages 1357-1373, December.
  11. Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo De Motta, 2015. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1805-1837, August.
  12. Pierre Chaigneau, 2015. "Changes in probability distributions and the form of compensation contracts," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 223-232, October.
  13. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 4-23.
  14. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 778-789.
  15. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Expliquer et contenir la prise de risque excessive des banques," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 89(2), pages 147-151, Juin.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Sahuguet, Nicolas & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2021. "The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 15625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Nikos Vafeas & Adamos Vlittis, 2024. "Earnings quality and board meeting frequency," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 1037-1067, April.

  2. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019. "The informativeness principle without the first-order approach," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102226, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniel F. Garrett & George Georgiadis & Alexey Smolin & Balazs Szentes, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Post-Print hal-04224372, HAL.

  3. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102227, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2023. "The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 141-185, March.
    2. Chang, Jen-Wen, 2020. "Monitoring and competing principals: A double-edged sword," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    3. Sebastian Gryglewicz & Barney Hartman-Glaser & Geoffery Zheng, 2020. "Growth Options, Incentives, and Pay for Performance: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1248-1277, March.
    4. Hackbarth, Dirk & Rivera, Alejandro & Wong, Tak-Yuen, 2018. "Optimal Short-Termism," CEPR Discussion Papers 12588, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  4. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2017. "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Post-Print halshs-02292785, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2022. "How should performance signals affect contracts?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 109005, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

  5. Chaigneau, Pierre & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 2016. "Downside risk neutral probabilities," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118980, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Cited by:

    1. Ekaterina Pirozhkova, 2017. "Banks' balance sheet, uncertainty and macroeconomy," EcoMod2017 10430, EcoMod.

  6. Edmans, Alex & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014. "The Generalized Informativeness Principle," CEPR Discussion Papers 10279, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Ewerhart, Christian, 2016. "An envelope approach to tournament design," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1-9.

  7. Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014. "The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 10143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Bengt Holmström, 2017. "Pay for Performance and Beyond," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 1753-1777, July.
    2. Schmalz, Martin & Ederer, Florian & Gine, Mireia & Antón, Miguel, 2018. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12674, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2018. "Contracting to compete for flows," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 289-319.
    4. Kelly Shue & Richard Townsend, 2016. "Growth through Rigidity: An Explanation for the Rise in CEO Pay," NBER Working Papers 21975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Scholarly Articles 34651704, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    6. Engert, Andreas & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2013. "Why agents need discretion: The business judgment rule as optimal standard of care," Working Papers 13-04, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    7. Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014. "The Value of Informativeness for Contracting," NBER Working Papers 20542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Heider, Florian & Calcagno, Riccardo, 2016. "Liquidity, Information Aggregation, and Market-Based Pay in an Efficient Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 11298, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. FOSCHI, Matteo; SANTOS-PINTO, Luís Pedro, 2017. "Subjective Performance Evaluation of Employees with Biased Beliefs," Economics Working Papers ECO 2017/08, European University Institute.

  8. Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014. "The Value of Informativeness for Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 10180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2018. "Contracting to compete for flows," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 289-319.
    2. Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Scholarly Articles 34651704, Harvard University Department of Economics.

  9. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2013. "The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 55405, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Cited by:

    1. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
    2. Qi Liu & Bo Sun, 2016. "Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Systemic Risk-Taking," International Finance Discussion Papers 1164, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

  10. Bouvard, Matthieu & Chaigneau, Pierre & Motta, Adolfo, 2012. "Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119052, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Cited by:

    1. Martinez-Miera, David & Ahnert, Toni, 2021. "Bank Runs, Bank Competition and Opacity," CEPR Discussion Papers 16207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Natalya Zelenyuk & Robert Faff & Shams Pathan, 2021. "The impact of voluntary capital adequacy disclosure on bank lending and liquidity creation," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(3), pages 3915-3935, September.
    3. Jungherr, Joachim, 2016. "Bank opacity and financial crises," Economics Working Papers ADE2016/02, European University Institute.
    4. Jungherr, Joachim, 2018. "Bank opacity and financial crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 157-176.
    5. Bermpei, Theodora & Kalyvas, Antonios & Nguyen, Thanh Cong, 2018. "Does institutional quality condition the effect of bank regulations and supervision on bank stability? Evidence from emerging and developing economies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 255-275.
    6. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Choo, Lawrence & Fonseca, Miguel A. & Kaplan, Todd R., 2021. "Should regulators always be transparent? a bank run experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    7. Fan, Yaoyao & Huang, Yichu & Jiang, Yuxiang & Liu, Frank Hong, 2020. "Watch out for bailout: TARP and bank earnings management," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    8. Fernando Alvarez & Gadi Barlevy, 2015. "Mandatory Disclosure and Financial Contagion," NBER Working Papers 21328, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard Hoberg, 2019. "Dynamic Interpretation of Emerging Risks in the Financial Sector," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(12), pages 4543-4603.
    10. Tirupam Goel & Isha Agarwal, 2021. "Limits of stress-test based bank regulation," BIS Working Papers 953, Bank for International Settlements.
    11. Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2023. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 1055-1095, April.
    12. Mei Li & Frank Milne & Junfeng Qiu, 2015. "Central Bank Screening, Moral Hazard, and the Lender of Last Resort Policy," Working Papers 1506, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    13. Ryuichiro Izumi, 2021. "Opacity: Insurance and Fragility," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 40, pages 146-169, April.
    14. König, Philipp Johann & Laux, Christian & Pothier, David, 2021. "The leverage effect of bank disclosures," Discussion Papers 31/2021, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    15. Karlo Kauko, 2021. "The Vanishing Interest Income of Chinese Banks," Asian Economic Papers, MIT Press, vol. 20(3), pages 94-113, Fall.
    16. Danielsson, Jon & Macrae, Robert & Uthemann, Andreas, 2022. "Artificial intelligence and systemic risk," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 111601, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Gary Gorton & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2020. "Fighting Crises with Secrecy," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 218-245, October.
    18. Philippon, Thomas & Martinez, Joseba & Faria e castro, Miguel, 2015. "Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity," CEPR Discussion Papers 10614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2020. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 14/2020, Bank of Finland.
    20. Toni Ahnert & Benjamin Nelson, 2016. "Opaque Assets and Rollover Risk," Staff Working Papers 16-17, Bank of Canada.
    21. Rhee, Keeyoung & Dogra, Keshav, 2024. "Stress tests and model monoculture," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    22. Pereira, Ana Elisa, 2021. "Rollover risk and stress test credibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 370-399.
    23. Chen, Qi & Goldstein, Itay & Huang, Zeqiong & Vashishtha, Rahul, 2022. "Bank transparency and deposit flows," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 475-501.
    24. Mark D. Flood & Dror Y. Kenett & Robin L. Lumsdaine & Jonathan K. Simon, 2017. "The Complexity of Bank Holding Companies: A Topological Approach," NBER Working Papers 23755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    25. Yaron Leitner, 2014. "Should regulators reveal information about banks?," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Q3, pages 1-8.
    26. Briana Chang & Martin Szydlowski, 2020. "The Market for Conflicted Advice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(2), pages 867-903, April.
    27. Itay Goldstein & Chong Huang, 2020. "Credit Rating Inflation and Firms' Investments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(6), pages 2929-2972, December.
    28. Céline Gauthier & Alfred Lehar & Héctor Pérez Saiz & Moez Souissi, 2015. "Emergency Liquidity Facilities, Signalling and Funding Costs," Staff Working Papers 15-44, Bank of Canada.
    29. Ana Babus & Maryam Farboodi, 2020. "The Hidden Costs of Strategic Opacity," NBER Working Papers 27471, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    30. Bischof, Jannis & Laux, Christian & Leuz, Christian, 2021. "Accounting for financial stability: Bank disclosure and loss recognition in the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(3), pages 1188-1217.
    31. Inostroza, Nicolas A. & Pavan, Alessandro, 0. "Adversarial coordination and public information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    32. Jin, Justin Y. & Ma, Mary L.Z. & Song, Victor & Guo, Mengyang, 2021. "Banks’ loan charge-offs and macro-level risk," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C).
    33. Kim, Jinyong & Kim, Mingook & Lee, Jeong Hwan, 2019. "The effect of TARP on loan loss provisions and bank transparency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 79-99.
    34. Bischof, Jannis & Laux, Christian & Leuz, Christian, 2020. "Accounting for financial stability: Lessons from the financial crisis and future challenges," SAFE Working Paper Series 283, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    35. White, Lucy & Walther, Ansgar, 2019. "Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 14048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    36. Natalya Zelenyuk & Robert Faff & Shams Pathan, 2020. "Size‐conditioned mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(4), pages 4387-4417, December.
    37. Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 34-69.
    38. Terovitis, Spyros, 2022. "Information disclosure and the feedback effect in capital markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    39. Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2018. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," 2018 Meeting Papers 566, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    40. Azarmsa, Ehsan & Cong, Lin William, 2020. "Persuasion in relationship finance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(3), pages 818-837.
    41. Carré, Sylvain, 2022. "Disclosures, rollover risk, and debt runs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    42. Shapiro, Joel & Zeng, Jing, 2019. "Stress Testing and Bank Lending," CEPR Discussion Papers 13907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    43. Michal Kowalik, 2016. "Opacity and Disclosure in Short-Term Wholesale Funding Markets," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers RPA 16-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    44. Xuewen Liu, 2018. "Diversification and Systemic Bank Runs," 2018 Meeting Papers 739, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    45. Evangelos Vasileiou, 2022. "Inaccurate Value at Risk Estimations: Bad Modeling or Inappropriate Data?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 59(3), pages 1155-1171, March.
    46. Schürhoff, Norman & Dieler, Tobias & Mancini, Loriano, 2021. "(In)efficient repo markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 15782, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    47. Moreno, Diego & Takalo, Tuomas, 2021. "Precision of public information disclosures, banks' stability and welfare," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 3/2021, Bank of Finland.
    48. Liang Dai & Dan Luo & Ming Yang, 2024. "Disclosure of Bank-Specific Information and the Stability of Financial Systems," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 37(4), pages 1315-1367.
    49. Lu, Tong & Ruan, Lijun, 2024. "Coordination and Conservatism," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    50. Agarwal, Isha & Goel, Tirupam, 2024. "Bank regulation and supervision: A symbiotic relationship," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    51. Avis Devine & Andrew Sanderford & Chongyu Wang, 2024. "Sustainability and Private Equity Real Estate Returns," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 161-187, February.
    52. Bo, Wang & Suli, Zheng, 2020. "Heterogeneous fragility, systematic panic and optimal transparency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    53. Andrea Bellucci & Gianluca Gucciardi, 2023. "A Turning Point for Banking: Unravelling the Changing Landscape of Banking Activity in Europe since the COVID-19 pandemic," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 183, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
    54. Carlos Corona & Lin Nan & Gaoqing Zhang, 2019. "The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(5), pages 1161-1200, December.
    55. Timmermann, Allan & Schmidt, Lawrence & , & Wermers, Russ, 2017. "Transparency, Investor Information Acquisition, and Money Market Fund Risk Rebalancing during the 2011-12 Eurozone Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 11895, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    56. Gaoqing Zhang, 2021. "Competition and Opacity in the Financial System," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1895-1913, March.
    57. Abad, Pilar & Robles, M.-Dolores & Alonso Orts, Carlos, 2023. "Stress testing programs and credit risk opacity of banks: USA vs Europe," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    58. Joel Shapiro & David Skeie, 2015. "Information Management in Banking Crises," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(8), pages 2322-2363.
    59. Moreno, Diego & Takalo, Tuomas, 2024. "Stress test precision and bank competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
    60. Gao, Pingyang & Jiang, Xu, 2018. "Reporting choices in the shadow of bank runs," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 85-108.
    61. Ding, Haina & Guembel, Alexander & Ozanne, Alessio, 2020. "Market Information in Banking Supervision: The Role of Stress Test Design," TSE Working Papers 20-1144, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    62. Biswas, Sonny & Koufopoulos, Kostas, 2022. "Bank capital structure and regulation: Overcoming and embracing adverse selection," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 973-992.
    63. Moreno, Diego & Takalo, Tuomas, 2024. "Stress test precision and bank competition," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 3/2024, Bank of Finland.
    64. Itay Goldstein & Alexandr Kopytov & Lin Shen & Haotian Xiang, 2020. "Bank Heterogeneity and Financial Stability," NBER Working Papers 27376, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    65. Joel Shapiro & Jing Zeng, 2024. "Stress Testing and Bank Lending," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 37(4), pages 1265-1314.
    66. Gu, Jiadong, 2023. "Optimal stress tests and liquidation cost," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    67. Enrico Perotti & Magdalena Rola-Janicka, 2022. "The Good, the Bad, and the Missed Boom," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(11), pages 5025-5056.
    68. Chu, Rongtai & Fan, Zhongjie & Liu, Zehao & Tang, Dunzhe, 2024. "Optimal primary dealer selection in financial networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).

  11. Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation," Cahiers de recherche 1207, CIRPEE.

    Cited by:

    1. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
    2. Wang, Cheng, 1997. "Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 72-105, September.
    3. Emmanuel Iatridis, George, 2018. "Accounting discretion and executive cash compensation: An empirical investigation of corporate governance, credit ratings and firm value," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 29-49.
    4. Rosalia Santulli, 2022. "“Fairness of CEO Compensation. A multi-faceted and multi-cultural framework to structure executive pay” by M.A. Eklund (Springer, 2019)," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 26(1), pages 315-325, March.
    5. Josef Schroth, 2015. "Managerial Compensation Duration and Stock Price Manipulation," Staff Working Papers 15-25, Bank of Canada.
    6. Josef Schroth, 2018. "Managerial Compensation and Stock Price Manipulation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(5), pages 1335-1381, December.
    7. Inderst, Roman & Hoffmann, Florian & Opp, Marcus, 2014. "Regulating Deferred Incentive Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 9877, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  12. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2011. "Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119059, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Cited by:

    1. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
    2. Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Effect of Risk Preferences on the Valuation and Incentives of Compensation Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 1209, CIRPEE.
    3. Tobias Huber & Johannes G. Jaspersen & Andreas Richter & Dennis Strümpel, 2023. "On the change of risk aversion in wealth: a field experiment in a closed economic system," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(1), pages 1-26, March.
    4. Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts," FMG Discussion Papers dp697, Financial Markets Group.

Articles

  1. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2023. "The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 141-185, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2020. "Downside risk-neutral probabilities," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 65-77, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019. "The informativeness principle without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 743-755.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2018. "The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 1297-1339, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Lucas W. Davis & Catherine Hausman, 2020. "Are Energy Executives Rewarded for Luck?," The Energy Journal, , vol. 41(6), pages 157-180, November.
    2. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Ademola Obafemi Young & Xuan Vinh Vo & Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al‐Faryan, 2022. "Do institutional framework and its threshold matter in the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance? Fresh insights from an emerging market economy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3386-3403, December.
    3. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Olaolu Richard Olayeni, 2020. "A new perspective into the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance: evidence from Nigeria’s listed firms," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 22(2), pages 250-277, December.
    4. Giorgio Barba Navaretti & Davide Castellani & Fabio Pieri, 2022. "CEO age, shareholder monitoring, and the organic growth of European firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 361-382, June.
    5. Chemmanur, Thomas J. & Hu, Gang & Li, Yingzhen & Xie, Jing, 2021. "Institutional trading, information production, and forced CEO turnovers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).

  5. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2018. "The optimal timing of CEO compensation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 90-94.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2017. "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 14-16.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Pierre Chaigneau, 2015. "Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(15), pages 1357-1373, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Sandrine Spaeter, 2018. "Incentive Contracts and Downside Risk Sharing," Post-Print halshs-02292797, HAL.
    2. Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5851, CESifo.
    3. François Desmoulins-Lebeault & Luc Meunier, 2018. "Moment Risks: Investment for Self and for a Firm," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 15(4), pages 242-266, December.

  9. Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo De Motta, 2015. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1805-1837, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 4-23.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  11. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 778-789.

    Cited by:

    1. Albuquerque, Rui & Cabral, Luis & Guedes, Jose, 2016. "Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk," CEPR Discussion Papers 11693, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Neus, Werner, 2014. "Eigenkapitalnormen, Boni und Risikoanreize in Banken," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 68(2), pages 92-107.
    3. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
    4. Gambacorta, Leonardo & Cerasi, Vittoria & Deininger, Sebastian M. & Oliviero, Tommaso, 2017. "How post-crisis regulation has affected bank CEO compensation," CEPR Discussion Papers 12008, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Gietl, Daniel, 2018. "Overconfidence and Bailouts," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 132, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    6. Carlos A. Arango & Oscar M. Valencia, 2015. "Macro-Prudential Policy under Moral Hazard and Financial Fragility," Borradores de Economia 12695, Banco de la Republica.
    7. Iyad Isbaita, 2020. "Corporate governance in banking institutions," Manager Journal, Faculty of Business and Administration, University of Bucharest, vol. 31(1), pages 75-85, December.
    8. Gietl, Daniel & Kassner, Bernhard, 2020. "Managerial Overconfidence and Bank Bailouts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 202-222.
    9. Dong, Y & Girardone, C & Kuo, J, 2016. "Governance, efficiency and risk taking in Chinese banking," Essex Finance Centre Working Papers 16588, University of Essex, Essex Business School.
    10. Douglas da Rosa München & Herbert Kimura, 2020. "Regulatory Banking Leverage: what do you know?," Working Papers Series 540, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    11. Feess, Eberhard & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2014. "Bank Capital Requirements and Mandatory Deferral of Compensation," MPRA Paper 59456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Zhiwei Su & Xingchun Wang, 2019. "Pricing executive stock options with averaging features under the Heston–Nandi GARCH model," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(9), pages 1056-1084, September.
    13. Chaiporn Vithessonthi, 2016. "Consequences of Bank Loan Growth: Evidence from Asia," PIER Discussion Papers 19, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.
    14. Carlos Arango & Oscar Valencia, 2015. "Macro-prudential Policies, Moral Hazard and Financial Fragility," IHEID Working Papers 06-2015, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 16 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (9) 2012-04-10 2012-06-05 2014-02-08 2014-12-19 2014-12-29 2014-12-29 2020-04-13 2021-05-10 2023-04-03. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (9) 2014-12-03 2014-12-19 2014-12-24 2014-12-29 2014-12-29 2014-12-29 2020-04-13 2021-05-10 2023-04-03. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (8) 2012-04-10 2012-04-10 2012-06-05 2014-02-08 2014-12-03 2014-12-19 2014-12-29 2014-12-29. Author is listed
  4. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (4) 2012-04-10 2012-06-05 2014-02-08 2021-05-17
  5. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (4) 2012-04-10 2014-12-24 2014-12-29 2024-08-26
  6. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (2) 2021-05-17 2023-04-03
  7. NEP-RMG: Risk Management (2) 2015-11-21 2020-04-13
  8. NEP-BAN: Banking (1) 2012-04-10
  9. NEP-CBA: Central Banking (1) 2012-04-10
  10. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2020-04-13

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