The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking
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DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12288
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- Agarwal, Isha & Goel, Tirupam, 2024. "Bank regulation and supervision: A symbiotic relationship," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
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