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Bank capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation

Author

Listed:
  • Eberhard Feess

    (Victoria University of Wellington)

  • Ansgar Wohlschlegel

    (Portsmouth Business School)

Abstract

We analyze the interplay of capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation in reducing banks’ risk taking incentives. Two heterogenous banks fund uncorrelated projects with fully diversifiable risk or correlated projects with systematic risk. One of both banks can identify project types and is superior at managing risks. If projects are in abundant supply, full mandatory deferral of compensation is optimal as it allows a larger banking sector without increasing the default risk. With limited supply of projects, deferred compensation may misallocate risky projects to the bank that is inferior at managing risks, so that early compensation may be optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Eberhard Feess & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2018. "Bank capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 206-242, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:53:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11149-018-9352-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-018-9352-3
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank regulation; Capital requirements; Mandatory deferral of compensation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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