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Should regulators reveal information about banks?

Author

Listed:
  • Yaron Leitner

Abstract

Regulators collect and produce information about banks. This information helps regulators monitor the safety and soundness of the banking system, and it also helps policymakers preserve financial stability. A key issue is whether this information should be made public and, if so, to what extent. In this article, we will explore some of the tradeoffs involved.

Suggested Citation

  • Yaron Leitner, 2014. "Should regulators reveal information about banks?," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Q3, pages 1-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpbr:00011
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    File URL: https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/economy/articles/business-review/2014/q3/brQ314_should_regulators_reveal_info.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Morrison, Alan D. & White, Lucy, 2013. "Reputational contagion and optimal regulatory forbearance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 642-658.
    2. Goldstein, Itay & Sapra, Haresh, 2014. "Should Banks' Stress Test Results be Disclosed? An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 8(1), pages 1-54, March.
    3. Yaron Leitner, 2012. "Inducing Agents to Report Hidden Trades: A Theory of an Intermediary," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 16(4), pages 1013-1042.
    4. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2008. "Should bank supervisors disclose information about their banks?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 94(Win), pages 1-16.
    5. Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo De Motta, 2015. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1805-1837, August.
    6. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    7. Schuermann, Til, 2014. "Stress testing banks," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 717-728.
    8. Joel Shapiro & David Skeie, 2015. "Information Management in Banking Crises," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(8), pages 2322-2363.
    9. Morrison, Alan & White, Lucy, 2013. "Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance," CEPR Discussion Papers 9508, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Yaron Leitner, 2005. "Financial Networks: Contagion, Commitment, and Private Sector Bailouts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2925-2953, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Choo, Lawrence & Fonseca, Miguel A. & Kaplan, Todd R., 2021. "Should regulators always be transparent? a bank run experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    2. König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2022. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    3. Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 34-69.
    4. Dmitry Orlov & Pavel Zryumov & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Itay Goldstein, 2023. "The Design of Macroprudential Stress Tests," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 36(11), pages 4460-4501.
    5. Mitchell Berlin, 2015. "Disclosure of stress test results," Working Papers 15-31, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    6. Rhee, Keeyoung & Dogra, Keshav, 2024. "Stress tests and model monoculture," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).

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