How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?
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- Edmans, Alex & Chaigneau, Pierre & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2021. "How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2022. "How should performance signals affect contracts?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 109005, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Carlos Miguel Glória & José Carlos Dias & João Pedro Ruas & João Pedro Vidal Nunes, 2024. "The interaction between equity-based compensation and debt in managerial risk choices," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 227-258, October.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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