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Michael Waldman

Personal Details

First Name:Michael
Middle Name:
Last Name:Waldman
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pwa40
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://www.johnson.cornell.edu/faculty-research/faculty/mw46/
Michael Waldman Johnson Graduate School of Management Cornell University Sage Hall Ithaca, NY 14853
(607) 255-8631
Terminal Degree:1982 Department of Economics; University of Pennsylvania (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Johnson Graduate School of Management
Cornell University

Ithaca, New York (United States)
http://www.johnson.cornell.edu/
RePEc:edi:gscorus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters Books

Working papers

  1. Yi Chen & Adam Dearing & Michael Waldman, 2024. "Overcoming Discrimination: Harassment and Discrimination Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 33065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Thomas Jungbauer & Sean Nicholson & June Pan & Michael Waldman, 2021. "The Organization of Innovation: Property Rights and the Outsourcing Decision," NBER Working Papers 28379, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Michael Waldman & Ian Novos, 2016. "Piracy of Intellectual Property: Past, Present, and Future," Working Papers id:10575, eSocialSciences.
  4. Waldman, Michael & Zax, Ori, 2014. "An exploration of the promotion signaling distortion," MPRA Paper 60656, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Waldman, Michael, 2013. "What Limits Indirect Appropriability?," MPRA Paper 44690, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Valerie Smeets & Michael Waldman & Frederic Warzynski, 2013. "Performance, Career Dynamics, and Span of Control," Economics Working Papers 2013-02, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
  7. Michael Waldman & Sean Nicholson & Nodir Adilov, 2012. "Positive and Negative Mental Health Consequences of Early Childhood Television Watching," NBER Working Papers 17786, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Dennis W. Carlton & Patrick Greenlee & Michael Waldman, 2008. "Assessing the Anticompetitive Effects of Multiproduct Pricing," NBER Working Papers 14199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2008. "Safe Harbors for Quantity Discounts and Bundling," EAG Discussions Papers 200801, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
  10. Dennis W. Carlton & Joshua S. Gans & Michael Waldman, 2007. "Why Tie A Product Consumers Do Not Use?," NBER Working Papers 13339, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Waldman, Michael, 2007. "Theory and evidence in internal labor markets," MPRA Paper 5113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Adilov, Nodir & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "Optimal copyright length and ex post investment: a Mickey Mouse approach," MPRA Paper 1551, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. DeVaro, Jed & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence," MPRA Paper 1550, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Michael Waldman & Sean Nicholson & Nodir Adilov, 2006. "Does Television Cause Autism?," NBER Working Papers 12632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Standard Promotion Practices Versus Up-Or-Out Contracts," Working Papers 06007, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
  16. Morita, Hodaka & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs," MPRA Paper 1426, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2005. "Tying, Upgrades, and Switching Costs in Durable-Goods Markets," NBER Working Papers 11407, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2004. "Standard Promotion Practices vs Up-Or-Out Contracts," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 132, Royal Economic Society.
  19. Michael Waldman, 2004. "Antitrust Perspectives for Durable-Goods Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 1306, CESifo.
  20. Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 2003. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms," Working papers 4324-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  21. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2001. "Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets," NBER Working Papers 8086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," NBER Working Papers 6831, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Oh, S. & Waldman, M., 1990. "The Macroeconomic Effects Of False Announcements," Papers 17, California Los Angeles - Applied Econometrics.
  25. Oh, S. & Waldman, M., 1990. "Aggregate Fluctuations And False Announcements: The Role Of Expectations," Papers 30, California Los Angeles - Applied Econometrics.
  26. Michael Waldman, 1990. "A Signalling Explanation for Seniority Based Promotions and Other Labor Market Puzzles," UCLA Economics Working Papers 599, UCLA Department of Economics.
  27. Seonghwan Oh & Michael Waldman, 1989. "Keynesian Coordination Failure and Persistence," UCLA Economics Working Papers 570, UCLA Department of Economics.
  28. Michael Waldman, 1989. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," UCLA Economics Working Papers 556, UCLA Department of Economics.
  29. Seongwan Oh & Michael Waldman, 1989. "The New Perspective on Keynesian Coordination Failure: Theory and Evidence," UCLA Economics Working Papers 559, UCLA Department of Economics.
  30. Michael Waldman, 1988. "What Would Darwin Say About Rational Expectations?," UCLA Economics Working Papers 478, UCLA Department of Economics.
  31. Michael Waldman, 1988. "The Simple Case of Entry Deterrence Reconsidered," UCLA Economics Working Papers 517, UCLA Department of Economics.
  32. Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1988. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Non-Paternalistic," UCLA Economics Working Papers 532, UCLA Department of Economics.
  33. Michael Waldman, 1988. "Interpreting Evidence on Returns to Tenure: The Significance of Quasi-Specific Human Capital," UCLA Economics Working Papers 479, UCLA Department of Economics.
  34. Michael Waldman, 1987. "Underinvestment in Entry Deterrence: When and Why," UCLA Economics Working Papers 456, UCLA Department of Economics.
  35. Sule Ozler & Michael Waldman, 1987. "Border Enforcement Versus Internal Enforcement: A Study in the Economics of Illegal Migration," UCLA Economics Working Papers 443, UCLA Department of Economics.
  36. Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1986. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," UCLA Economics Working Papers 402, UCLA Department of Economics.
  37. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1986. "The Role of Altruism in Economic Interaction," UCLA Economics Working Papers 391, UCLA Department of Economics.
  38. Ian E. Novos & Michael Waldman, 1986. "Complementarity and Partial Nonexcludability: An Analysis of the Software/Computer Market," UCLA Economics Working Papers 403, UCLA Department of Economics.
  39. Ian E. Novos & Michael Waldman, 1986. "The Emergence of Copying Technologies: What Have We Learned," UCLA Economics Working Papers 408, UCLA Department of Economics.
  40. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1986. "Limited Rationality and Synergism: The IMplications for Macroeconomics," UCLA Economics Working Papers 389, UCLA Department of Economics.
  41. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1985. "Rational Expectations in the Aggregate," UCLA Economics Working Papers 327, UCLA Department of Economics.
  42. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1985. "Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption," UCLA Economics Working Papers 370, UCLA Department of Economics.
  43. Michael Waldman, 1985. "Information on Worker Ability: An Analysis of Inverstment Within the Firm," UCLA Economics Working Papers 375, UCLA Department of Economics.
  44. Michael Waldman, 1985. "Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem," UCLA Economics Working Papers 364, UCLA Department of Economics.
  45. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1985. "The Pros and Cons of Renegotiation," UCLA Economics Working Papers 338, UCLA Department of Economics.
  46. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1984. "Insurance Aspects of Labor Market Contracting: An Overview," UCLA Economics Working Papers 348, UCLA Department of Economics.
  47. Michael Waldman, 1984. "The Role of Integrity in Economic Interaction," UCLA Economics Working Papers 350, UCLA Department of Economics.
  48. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1983. "Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity," UCLA Economics Working Papers 303, UCLA Department of Economics.
  49. Michael Waldman, 1983. "Optimal Pricing Given Transaction Costs: The Case of Reserve Versus General Admission Seating," UCLA Economics Working Papers 284, UCLA Department of Economics.
  50. Ian Novos & Michael Waldman, 1983. "The Social Welfare Consequences of Limiting Nonexcludability: An Analytical Approach," UCLA Economics Working Papers 295, UCLA Department of Economics.
  51. Michael Waldman, 1983. "Limited Collusion and Entry Deterence," UCLA Economics Working Papers 306, UCLA Department of Economics.
  52. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1983. "Interpreting Real World Contracts: An Investigation of Ex Post Mutually Beneficial Agreements," UCLA Economics Working Papers 290, UCLA Department of Economics.
  53. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1983. "Why Bad Wokers Receive Raises," UCLA Economics Working Papers 301, UCLA Department of Economics.
  54. Michael Waldman, 1983. "Job Assignments, Signalling nad Efficiency," UCLA Economics Working Papers 286, UCLA Department of Economics.
  55. Ari Gerstle & Michael Waldman, "undated". "Mergers In Durable-Goods Industries: A Re-Examination Of Market Power And Welfare Effects," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1038, American Law & Economics Association.

Articles

  1. Thomas Jungbauer & Michael Waldman, 2023. "Self-Reported Signaling," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 78-117, August.
  2. Kevin F. Hallock & Xin Jin & Michael Waldman, 2022. "The total compensation gap, wage gap and benefit gap between workers with and without a disability," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 60(1), pages 3-31, March.
  3. Cooper, Kristen & Schneider, Henry & Waldman, Michael, 2021. "Limited rationality and the strategic environment: Further evidence from a pricing game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
  4. Michael Waldman & Ori Zax, 2020. "Promotion Signaling and Human Capital Investments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 125-155, February.
  5. Xin Jin & Michael Waldman, 2020. "Lateral Moves, Promotions, and Task-Specific Human Capital: Theory and Evidence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(1), pages 1-46.
  6. Valerie Smeets & Michael Waldman & Frederic Warzynski, 2019. "Performance, Career Dynamics, and Span of Control," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(4), pages 1183-1213.
  7. Emre Ekinci & Antti Kauhanen & Michael Waldman, 2019. "Bonuses and Promotion Tournaments: Theory and Evidence," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(622), pages 2342-2389.
  8. Cooper, Kristen B. & Schneider, Henry S. & Waldman, Michael, 2017. "Limited rationality and the strategic environment: Further theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 188-208.
  9. Michael Waldman & Ori Zax, 2016. "An Exploration of the Promotion Signaling Distortion," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 119-149.
  10. Gerstle, Ari D. & Waldman, Michael, 2016. "Mergers in durable-goods industries: A re-examination of market power and welfare effects," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 677-692.
  11. Waldman, Michael, 2016. "The dual avenues of labor market signaling," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 120-134.
  12. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2014. "Robert Bork's Contributions to Antitrust Perspectives on Tying Behavior," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(S3), pages 121-144.
  13. Justin P. Johnson & Henry S. Schneider & Michael Waldman, 2014. "The Role and Growth of New-Car Leasing: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(3), pages 665-698.
  14. Nodir Adilov & Michael Waldman, 2013. "Optimal Copyright Length And Ex Post Investment: A Mickey Mouse Approach," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(2), pages 1101-1122, April.
  15. Waldman, Michael, 2013. "Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 198-210.
  16. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2012. "Upgrades, Switching Costs and the Leverage Theory of Tying," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(561), pages 675-706, June.
  17. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
  18. Michael Waldman, 2010. "Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(1), pages 54-91, April.
  19. Dennis W. Carlton & Joshua S. Gans & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Why Tie a Product Consumers Do Not Use?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 85-105, August.
  20. Justin P. Johnson & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Leasing, Lemons, and Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 307-328, May.
  21. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Standard promotion practices versus up‐or‐out contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 301-325, June.
  22. Hodaka Morita & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 230-255, February.
  23. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 59-108, January.
  24. Seonghwan Oh & Michael Waldman, 2005. "The Index of Leading Economic Indicators as a Source of Expectational Shocks," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 75-95, Winter.
  25. Hodaka Morita & Michael Waldman, 2004. "Durable Goods, Monopoly Maintenance, and Time Inconsistency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 273-302, June.
  26. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2004. "Task-Specific Human Capital," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 203-207, May.
  27. Johnson, Justin P & Waldman, Michael, 2003. "Leasing, Lemons, and Buybacks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 247-265, Summer.
  28. Michael Waldman, 2003. "Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 131-154, Winter.
  29. Michael Waldman, 2003. "Ex Ante versus Ex Post Optimal Promotion Rules: The Case of Internal Promotion," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(1), pages 27-41, January.
  30. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2002. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 194-220, Summer.
  31. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1999. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(4), pages 1321-1358.
  32. Ian E. Novos & Michael Waldman, 1997. "Returns to Tenure; Conceptual and Empirical Issues," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 337-345, Summer.
  33. Waldman, Michael, 1997. "Eliminating the Market for Secondhand Goods: An Alternative Explanation for Leasing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 61-92, April.
  34. Waldman, Michael, 1996. "Durable Goods Pricing When Quality Matters," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(4), pages 489-510, October.
  35. Waldman, Michael, 1996. "Asymmetric learning and the wage/productivity relationship," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 419-429, December.
  36. Michael Waldman, 1996. "Planned Obsolescence and the R&D Decision," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 583-595, Autumn.
  37. Waldman, Michael, 1994. "Systematic Errors and the Theory of Natural Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 482-497, June.
  38. Oh, Seonghwan & Waldman, Michael, 1994. "Strategic Complementarity Slows Macroeconomic Adjustment to Temporary Shocks," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 318-329, April.
  39. Michael Waldman, 1993. "A New Perspective on Planned Obsolescence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(1), pages 273-283.
  40. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1993. "The role of altruism in economic interaction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-15, May.
  41. Michael Waldman, 1992. "Book Review: Human Resources, Personnel, and Organizational Behavior: The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 46(1), pages 206-207, October.
  42. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Responders versus Non-responders: A New Perspective on Heterogeneity," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(408), pages 1085-1102, September.
  43. Michael Waldman, 1991. "The Role of Multiple Potential Entrants/Sequential Entry in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 446-453, Autumn.
  44. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1345-1351, December.
  45. Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(1), pages 155-165.
  46. Waldman, Michael, 1990. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-250, April.
  47. Seonghwan Oh & Michael Waldman, 1990. "The Macroeconomic Effects of False Announcements," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(4), pages 1017-1034.
  48. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1989. "Limited Rationality and Strategic Complements: The Implications for Macroeconomics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(3), pages 463-483.
  49. Haltiwanger, John C & Waldman, Michael, 1989. "Rational Expectations in the Aggregate," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(4), pages 619-636, October.
  50. Waldman, Michael, 1989. "Information on worker ability : An analysis of investment within the firm," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 57-80.
  51. Michael Waldman, 1987. "Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(2), pages 301-310.
  52. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1986. "Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 355-375, July.
  53. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1985. "Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 326-340, June.
  54. Novos, Ian E & Waldman, Michael, 1984. "The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(2), pages 236-246, April.
  55. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(1), pages 95-109.
  56. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.

Chapters

  1. Michael Waldman, 2014. "What limits indirect appropriability?," Chapters, in: Richard Watt (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Copyright, chapter 2, pages 26-48, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  2. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
  3. Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 1999. "Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 36, pages 2373-2437, Elsevier.

Books

  1. Michael Waldman (ed.), 2017. "Learning in Labour Markets," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 17336.
  2. Michael Waldman (ed.), 2007. "Pricing Tactics, Strategies, and Outcomes," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 3898.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Distinct Works
  3. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
  6. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  7. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  8. Number of Citations
  9. Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
  10. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  18. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  19. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  20. h-index
  21. Number of Registered Citing Authors
  22. Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
  23. Number of Journal Pages
  24. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  25. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  26. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  27. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  28. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  29. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  30. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  31. Euclidian citation score
  32. Breadth of citations across fields
  33. Wu-Index
  34. Record of graduates

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 16 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (6) 2004-11-07 2005-06-14 2007-01-14 2007-02-10 2007-08-27 2008-07-30. Author is listed
  2. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (3) 2007-01-14 2007-01-28 2013-02-16
  3. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (3) 2007-01-14 2007-10-06 2013-02-16
  4. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2004-11-22 2007-01-14
  5. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2005-06-14 2007-08-27
  6. NEP-CSE: Economics of Strategic Management (1) 2021-02-15
  7. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2013-02-16
  8. NEP-DEM: Demographic Economics (1) 2012-02-20
  9. NEP-ENT: Entrepreneurship (1) 2021-02-15
  10. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2001-06-08
  11. NEP-HEA: Health Economics (1) 2012-02-20
  12. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2013-02-16
  13. NEP-INO: Innovation (1) 2021-02-15
  14. NEP-IPR: Intellectual Property Rights (1) 2013-03-16
  15. NEP-LMA: Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages (1) 2013-02-16
  16. NEP-LTV: Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty (1) 2003-07-21
  17. NEP-MKT: Marketing (1) 2008-07-30
  18. NEP-PPM: Project, Program and Portfolio Management (1) 2007-02-10
  19. NEP-SBM: Small Business Management (1) 2021-02-15
  20. NEP-SPO: Sports and Economics (1) 2024-11-11
  21. NEP-TID: Technology and Industrial Dynamics (1) 2021-02-15

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