Marco Celentani
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
- Marco Celentani & Miguel García-Posada & Fernando Gómez, 2010.
"The Spanish Business Bankruptcy Puzzle and the Crisis,"
Working Papers
2010-11, FEDEA.
Cited by:
- Benito Arruñada, 2021. "Interpretación positiva del derecho concursal español y propuestas para una reforma equilibrada," Policy Papers 2021-08, FEDEA.
- Piotr Staszkiewicz & Sylwia Morawska, 2019. "The efficiency of bankruptcy law: evidence of creditor protection in Poland," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 365-383, December.
- Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti & Marta Martínez-Matute & Miguel García-Posada, 2016.
"Credit, crisis and contract enforcement: evidence from the Spanish loan market,"
Working Papers
1630, Banco de España.
- Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti & Marta Martínez-Matute & Miguel García-Posada, 2017. "Credit, crisis and contract enforcement: evidence from the Spanish loan market," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 361-383, October.
- Miguel García-Posada & Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, 2013.
"Are there alternatives to bankruptcy? a study of small business distress in Spain,"
Working Papers
1315, Banco de España.
- Miguel García-Posada & Juan Mora-Sanguinetti, 2014. "Are there alternatives to bankruptcy? A study of small business distress in Spain," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 287-332, August.
- García-Posada Gómez, Miguel & Vegas Sánchez, Raquel, 2018. "Bankruptcy reforms in the midst of the Great Recession: The Spanish experience," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 71-95.
- Ewelina Mruk & Inmaculada Aguiar-Díaz & Maria Victoria Ruiz-Mallorquí, 2019. "Use of formal insolvency procedure and judicial efficiency in Spain," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 435-470, June.
- Montero, José Manuel & Urtasun, Alberto, 2021. "Markup dynamics and financial frictions: The Spanish case," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 316-341.
- Nicodemo, Catia, 2013. "Immigration and Labor Productivity: New Empirical Evidence for Spain," IZA Discussion Papers 7297, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Marco Celentani & Rosa Loveira-Pazó, 2004.
"What form of relative performance evaluation?,"
Economics Working Papers
744, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Cited by:
- Marco Celentani & Rosa Loveira, 2006. "A Simple Explanation of the Relative Performance Evaluation Puzzle," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(3), pages 525-540, July.
- Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii, 2006. "Common Shocks and Relative Compensation," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 407-420, October.
- Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina & Salvatore Piccolo, 2005. "Competitive Pressure, Incentives and Managerial Rewards," CSEF Working Papers 148, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jul 2006.
- Celentani, Marco & Desmet, Klaus & Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio, 2004.
"Inflation in Open Economies with Complete Markets,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4385, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Celentani & J. Conde-Ruiz & Klaus Desmet, 2007. "Inflation in Open Economies with Complete Markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(2), pages 271-291, May.
- Marco Celentani & J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Klaus Desmet, "undated". "Inflation in open economies with complete markets," Working Papers 2004-12, FEDEA.
Cited by:
- David M. Arseneau, 2004.
"Expectation traps in a New Keynesian open economy model,"
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
2004-45, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- David Arseneau, 2012. "Expectation traps in a new Keynesian open economy model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(1), pages 81-112, January.
- Simon Sosvilla-Rivero & Pedro N. Rodríguez, "undated".
"Linkages in international stock markets: Evidence from a classification procedure,"
Working Papers
2004-23, FEDEA.
- Simon Sosvilla-Rivero & Pedro Rodriguez, 2010. "Linkages in international stock markets: evidence from a classification procedure," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(16), pages 2081-2089.
- Timur Hulagu & Devrim Ikizler, 2010. "Effects of Monetary Unions on Inequalities (Para Birliklerinin Esitsizlikler Uzerindeki Etkileri)," Working Papers 1014, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
- Sara Eugeni, 2019. "Exchange rate volatility and cooperation in an incomplete markets' economy," Department of Economics Working Papers 2019_02, Durham University, Department of Economics.
- Marco Celentani & Juan José Ganuza & José L. Peydró, 2003.
"Combating corruption in international business transactions,"
Economics Working Papers
670, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2003.
- Juan-José Ganuza & Marco Celentani & José-Luis Peydró, 2003. "Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions," Working Papers 106, Barcelona School of Economics.
Cited by:
- Bahoo, Salman & Alon, Ilan & Paltrinieri, Andrea, 2020. "Corruption in international business: A review and research agenda," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(4).
- José Manuel Martins Caetano & António Caleiro, 2005.
"Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment:What kind of relationship is there?,"
Economics Working Papers
18_2005, University of Évora, Department of Economics (Portugal).
- Caetano, José & Caleiro, António, 2005. "Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment. What kind of relationship is there?," EconStor Preprints 142738, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Doren Chadee & Banjo Roxas & Alexandre Kouznetsov, 2021. "Corruption, Bribery and Innovation in CEE: Where is the Link?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 174(4), pages 747-762, December.
- Marco Celentani & J. Ignacio Conde & Klaus Desmet, 2002.
"Endogenous policy leads to inefficient risk sharing,"
Economics Working Papers
593, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2003.
- Marco Celentani & J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Klaus Desmet, 2004. "Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk Sharing," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(3), pages 758-787, July.
- Marco Celentani & J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Klaus Desmet, "undated". "Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk Sharing," Working Papers 2003-08, FEDEA.
- Celentani, Marco & Desmet, Klaus & Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio, 2003. "Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk-Sharing," CEPR Discussion Papers 3866, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Cited by:
- Mattozzi, Andrea., 2005.
"Policy uncertainty, electoral securities and redistribution,"
Working Papers
1229, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Andrea Mattozzi, 2010. "Policy Uncertainty, Electoral Securities, And Redistribution," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(1), pages 45-71, February.
- Andrea Mattozzi, 2003. "Policy Uncertainty, Electoral Securities and Redistribution," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000260, David K. Levine.
- Morelli, Massimo & Tavares, José & Luque, Jaime, 2011. "Fiscal Union Consensus Design under the Risk of Autarky," CEPR Discussion Papers 8552, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Guiso, Luigi & Herrera, Helios & Morelli, Massimo & Sonno, Tommaso, 2018.
"Global Crises and Populism: the Role of Eurozone Institutions,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
12944, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Luigi Guiso & Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli & Tommaso Sonno, 2018. "Global Crises and Populism: the Role of Eurozone Institutions," EIEF Working Papers Series 1806, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised May 2018.
- Luque, Jaime & Morelli, Massimo & Tavares, José, 2014. "A volatility-based theory of fiscal union desirability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 1-11.
- José Tavares, 2012. "Fiscal Union Consensus Design Under The Threat Of Autarky," 2012 Meeting Papers 202, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Mattozzi, Andrea, 2004.
"Can we insure against political uncertainty? Evidence from the U.S. Stock Market,"
Working Papers
1207, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Andrea Mattozzi, 2008. "Can we insure against political uncertainty? Evidence from the U.S. stock market," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 43-55, October.
- Juan Prieto & Juan Gabriel Rodríguez & Rafael Salas, "undated". "Polarization, Inequality and Tax Reforms," Working Papers 2003-23, FEDEA.
- Marco Celentani & J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Klaus Desmet, "undated".
"Inflation in open economies with complete markets,"
Working Papers
2004-12, FEDEA.
- Marco Celentani & J. Conde-Ruiz & Klaus Desmet, 2007. "Inflation in Open Economies with Complete Markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(2), pages 271-291, May.
- Celentani, Marco & Desmet, Klaus & Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio, 2004. "Inflation in Open Economies with Complete Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 4385, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Giovannini, Alessandro & Ioannou, Demosthenes & Stracca, Livio, 2022. "Public and private risk sharing: friends or foes? The interplay between different forms of risk sharing," Occasional Paper Series 295, European Central Bank.
- Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2001.
"Organized vs. competitive corruption,"
Economics Working Papers
526, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2001.
- Marco Celentani & Juan-José Ganuza, 2002. "Organized vs. Competitive Corruption," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 293-315, January.
Cited by:
- Uberti, Luca J., 2022. "Corruption and growth: Historical evidence, 1790–2010," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 321-349.
- Keith Blackburn & Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, 2009.
"Why is Corruption Less Harmful in Some Countries Than in Others?,"
Post-Print
hal-00725353, HAL.
- Keith Blackburn & Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, 2007. "Why is Corruption Less Harmful in Some Countries Than in Others?," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 88, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Blackburn, Keith & Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F., 2009. "Why is corruption less harmful in some countries than in others?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 797-810, December.
- Reyes Calderón & José Luis à lvarez Arce, 2007. "Corruption, Complexity and Governance," Faculty Working Papers 11/07, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2005.
"Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement,"
Working Papers
halshs-00590773, HAL.
- Ariane Lambert‐Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in Procurement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 883-908, December.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Collusive market sharing and corruption in procurement," Post-Print halshs-00754175, HAL.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590773, HAL.
- Roy Cerqueti & Raffaella Coppier, 2016. "A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 243(1), pages 71-87, August.
- Keith Blackburn & Gareth Downing, 2015. "Deconcentration, Corruption and Economic Growth," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 209, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2024. "Corruption and Renegotiation in Procurement," Working Papers 334, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000.
"Corruption and competition in procurement,"
Economics Working Papers
464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001.
- Celentani, Marco & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002. "Corruption and competition in procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1273-1303, July.
- Keith Blackburn & Yuanyuan Wang, 2009. "Uncertainty, Entrepreneurship and the Organisation of Corruption," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 133, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Pierre-Henri Morand & François Marechal, 2023. "Achats publics responsables et achat local : enseignements des données ouvertes françaises," Post-Print hal-03842464, HAL.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2003.
"Corruption and Collusion in Procurement Tenders,"
Working Papers
w0036, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Ariane Lambert‐Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in Procurement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 883-908, December.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2003. "Corruption and Collusion in Procurement Tenders," Working Papers w0036, New Economic School (NES).
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590773, HAL.
- Caruana, Guillermo, 2001.
"Career concerns and contingent compensation,"
UC3M Working papers. Economics
we014811, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
Cited by:
- Abel Elizalde & Rafael Repullo, 2004.
"Economic and Regulatory Capital. What Is the Difference?,"
Working Papers
wp2004_0422, CEMFI.
- Repullo, Rafael & Elizalde, Abel, 2004. "Economic and Regulatory Capital: What is the Difference?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4770, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Celentani & Rosa Loveira & Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, 2010. "Executive Pay with Observable Decisions," Working Papers 2010-29, FEDEA.
- Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2006.
"Precautionary Savings or Working Longer Hours?,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 326-352, April.
- Pijoan-Mas, Josep, 2005. "Precautionary Savings or Working Longer Hours?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2003. "Precautionary Savings or Working Longer Hours?," Working Papers wp2003_0311, CEMFI.
- Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2004. "Precautionary Savings or Working Longer Hours?," 2004 Meeting Papers 350, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Guillermo Caruana & Marco Celentani, 2002. "Career Concerns and Contingent Compensation," Working Papers wp2002_0205, CEMFI.
- Abel Elizalde & Rafael Repullo, 2004.
"Economic and Regulatory Capital. What Is the Difference?,"
Working Papers
wp2004_0422, CEMFI.
- Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000.
"Corruption and competition in procurement,"
Economics Working Papers
464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001.
- Celentani, Marco & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002. "Corruption and competition in procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1273-1303, July.
Cited by:
- Andreas Christos Pliatsidis, 2024. "Analyzing concentration in the Greek public procurement market: a network theory approach," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 51(2), pages 431-480, June.
- Pablo Ballesteros-P�rez & Martin Skitmore & Eugenio Pellicer & M. Carmen Gonz�lez-Cruz, 2015. "Scoring rules and abnormally low bids criteria in construction tenders: a taxonomic review," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(4), pages 259-278, April.
- Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2005.
"Bid Rigging. An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
39, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2005. "Bid Rigging – An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1488, CESifo.
- Leandro Arozamena & Juan-José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021.
"Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions,"
Documentos de Trabajo
19429, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA).
- Leandro Arozamena & Juan-José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021. "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Working Papers 1275, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021. "Renegotiation and discrimination in symmetric procurement auctions," Economics Working Papers 1790, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Leandro Arozamena & Juan-José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021. "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Documentos de Trabajo 19430, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA).
- Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021. "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Working Papers 83, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Leandro Arozamena & Federico Weinschelbaum & Juan-José Ganuza, 2021. "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Department of Economics Working Papers 2021_09, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
- SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2024. "Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-138, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- J. Reiß & Jens Schöndube, 2010.
"First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 99-141, April.
- Reiss, J.P. & Schoendube, J.R., 2007. "First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Jana Krajcova, 2010. "On the Hidden Costs of Monitoring Corruption or Effort," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp404, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Giuseppe Albanese & Federico Antellini Russo & Roberto Zampino, 2015. "Crime and public procurement, evidence from municipalities," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 294, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Þevket Alper Koç, 2008. "Effects Of Asymmetry On Ex Ante Corruption At Auctions," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 22(1+2), pages 17-33.
- Maria Rosa Battaggion & Steven Jeremy Ntambi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2020. "On the Dark Side of Political Stability," CSEF Working Papers 565, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Libor Dušek & Andreas Ortmann & Lubomír Lízal, 2005. "Understanding Corruption and Corruptibility Through Experiments," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2005(2), pages 147-162.
- Gen-Fu Feng & Bo Sui & Min-Yi Dong & Chun-xia Jiang & Chun-Ping Chang, 2018. "Border is better than distance? Contagious corruption in one belt one road economies," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 1909-1928, July.
- Gustavo Piga, 2011. "A Fighting Chance Against Corruption in Public Procurement?," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Anna Balsevich & Elena Podkolzina, 2014. "Indicators Of Corruption In Public Procurement: The Example Of Russian Regions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 76/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Huang, Yangguang & Xia, Jijun, 2019. "Procurement auctions under quality manipulation corruption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 380-399.
- Frédéric Boehm & Juanita Olaya, 2006. "Corruption In Public Contracting Auctions: The Role Of Transparency In Bidding Processes," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(4), pages 431-452, December.
- Gauthier, Bernard & Goyette, Jonathan & Kouamé, Wilfried A.K., 2021.
"Why do firms pay bribes? Evidence on the demand and supply sides of corruption in developing countries,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 463-479.
- Gauthier,Bernard P. & Goyette,Jonathan & Kouame,Wilfried Anicet Kouakou, 2020. "Why Do Firms Pay Bribes? : Evidence on the Demand and Supply Sides of Corruption in Developing Countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9441, The World Bank.
- Maréchal, François & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2022. "Are social and environmental clauses a tool for favoritism? Analysis of French public procurement contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2005.
"Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement,"
Working Papers
halshs-00590773, HAL.
- Ariane Lambert‐Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in Procurement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 883-908, December.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Collusive market sharing and corruption in procurement," Post-Print halshs-00754175, HAL.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590773, HAL.
- Decio Coviello & Mario Mariniello, 2008.
"Does Publicity Affect Competition? Evidence from Discontinuities in Public Procurement Auctions,"
CSEF Working Papers
189, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Decio Coviello & Mario Mariniello, 2008. "Does Publicity Affect Competition? Evidence from Discontinuities in Public Procurement Auctions?," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/04, European University Institute.
- Huang, Shaoqing & Xie, Weisi & Xu, Xiaoshu, 2024. "Bureaucracy-business relationship, corruption and the implications for marketization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 634-644.
- Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2010. "Auctions and corruption: An analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 1872-1892, October.
- Olga Chiappinelli, 2016.
"Political Corruption in the Execution of Public Contracts,"
Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin
1607, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Chiappinelli, Olga, 2016. "Political corruption in the execution of public contracts," MPRA Paper 73487, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Chiappinelli, Olga, 2020. "Political corruption in the execution of public contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 116-140.
- Serena Brianzoni & Raffaella Coppier & Elisabetta Michetti, 2012. "A Growth Model with Corruption in Public Procurement: Equilibria and Policy Implications," Working Papers 68-2012, Macerata University, Department of Finance and Economic Sciences, revised Sep 2015.
- Ratbek Dzhumashev, 2014. "The Two-Way Relationship Between Government Spending And Corruption And Its Effects On Economic Growth," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 403-419, April.
- Ndiaye Cheikh Tidiane, 2019. "Corruption, Investment and Economic Growth in WAEMU Countries," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 11(4), pages 30-39, April.
- Kenny, Charles & Soreide, Tina, 2008. "Grand Corruption in Utilities," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4805, The World Bank.
- Paulo Klinger Monteiro & Flavio Menezes, 2001.
"Corruption and auctions,"
Microeconomics
0105002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2006. "Corruption and auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 97-108, February.
- Huang, Yangguang, 2019. "An empirical study of scoring auctions and quality manipulation corruption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
- Nicola Doni, 2007. "A Comparison of Alternative Procedures for the Selection of the Private Partner in PPP Projects," Working Papers - Economics wp2007_10, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Robert Ridlon & Jiwoong Shin, 2013. "Favoring the Winner or Loser in Repeated Contests," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(5), pages 768-785, September.
- Juan-José Ganuza & Marco Celentani & José-Luis Peydró, 2003.
"Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions,"
Working Papers
106, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Marco Celentani & Juan José Ganuza & José L. Peydró, 2003. "Combating corruption in international business transactions," Economics Working Papers 670, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2003.
- Zhe Chen, 2021. "The bid orchestration and competitions in scoring procurement auctions," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(7), pages 1718-1729, October.
- Arnold, Ulli & Neubauer, Joerg & Schoenherr, Tobias, 2012. "Explicating factors for companies’ inclination towards corruption in Operations and supply chain management: An exploratory study in Germany," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 136-147.
- Dzhumashev, Ratbek, 2014. "Corruption and growth: The role of governance, public spending, and economic development," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 202-215.
- Koc, Sevket Alper & Neilson, William S., 2008. "Interim bribery in auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 238-241, May.
- Helene Mass & Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2020.
"Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 189-245, August.
- Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass & Achim Wambach, 2020. "Imitation Perfection - A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_225v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Mass, Helene & Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2017. "Imitation perfection: A simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-058, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Mass, Helene & Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2017. "Imitation perfection - a simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168217, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Wang, Hong, 2020. "Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 283(3), pages 1124-1135.
- Andrei Yakovlev & Oleg Vyglovsky & Olga Demidova & Alexander Bashlyk, 2015.
"Incentives For Repeated Contracts In Public Sector: Empirical Study Of Gasoline Procurement In Russia,"
HSE Working papers
WP BRP 24/PA/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Andrei Yakovlev & Oleg Vyglovsky & Olga Demidova & Alexander Bashlyk, 2016. "Incentives for repeated contracts in public sector: empirical study of gasoline procurement in Russia," International Journal of Procurement Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 9(3), pages 272-289.
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"Organized vs. Competitive Corruption,"
Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 293-315, January.
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- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "When is reputation bad?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 10, pages 177-205, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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1962, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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- Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Discussion Papers 1358, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "When is reputation bad?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 10, pages 177-205, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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Articles
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"Inflation in Open Economies with Complete Markets,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(2), pages 271-291, May.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Marco Celentani & J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Klaus Desmet, "undated". "Inflation in open economies with complete markets," Working Papers 2004-12, FEDEA.
- Celentani, Marco & Desmet, Klaus & Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio, 2004. "Inflation in Open Economies with Complete Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 4385, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Celentani & Rosa Loveira, 2006.
"A Simple Explanation of the Relative Performance Evaluation Puzzle,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(3), pages 525-540, July.
Cited by:
- Kim, Kyonghee, 2010. "Blockholder monitoring and the efficiency of pay-performance benchmarking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 748-766, December.
- Arantxa Jarque, 2014. "The Complexity of CEO Compensation," Working Paper 14-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Stanimir Morfov & Manuel Santos, 2017. "A Model of Managerial Talent: Addressing Some Puzzles in CEO Compensation," Working Papers 2017-03, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Pierre Fleckinger, 2012.
"Correlation and relative performance evaluation,"
Post-Print
hal-00670892, HAL.
- Pierre Fleckinger, 2012. "Correlation and relative performance evaluation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00670892, HAL.
- Fleckinger, Pierre, 2012. "Correlation and relative performance evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 93-117.
- Jean-Pierre Danthine & John Donaldson, 2015.
"Executive Compensation: A General Equilibrium Perspective,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 269-286, April.
- Jean-Pierre Danthine, 2010. "Executive Compensation: A General Equilibrium Perspective," Working Papers 2010-19, Swiss National Bank.
- Zhao, Shuo, 2024. "Essays on banking regulations," Other publications TiSEM 20e6957b-9a5a-4e65-a081-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "Optimal CEO compensation and stock options," Working Papers. Serie EC 2008-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Jarque, Arantxa & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2020.
"Banker compensation, relative performance, and bank risk,"
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
- Arantxa Jarque & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2019. "Banker Compensation, Relative Performance, and Bank Risk," Working Papers 19-20, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Albuquerque, Rui & Cabral, Luis & Guedes, Jose, 2016.
"Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
11693, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rui Albuquerque & Luis Cabral & Jose Guedes, 2018. "Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk," Working Papers 18-13, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Rui Albuquerque & Luís Cabral & José Guedes, 2019. "Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(11), pages 4304-4342.
- Fuqiang Lu & Liying Wang & Hualing Bi & Zichao Du & Suxin Wang, 2021. "An Improved Revenue Distribution Model for Logistics Service Supply Chain Considering Fairness Preference," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(12), pages 1-30, June.
- Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert, 2012.
"Due Diligence, Research Joint Ventures, and Incentives to Innovate,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(4), pages 588-611, December.
- Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert, 2011. "Due diligence, research joint ventures, and incentives to innovate," Working Papers 1113, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2011.
- Fabrizi, Simona & Lippert, Steffen, 2011. "Due diligence, research joint ventures, and incentives to innovate," MPRA Paper 33207, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "CEO compensation : trends, market changes, and regulation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 94(Sum), pages 265-300.
- Mao, Wenfeng & Cai, Siyuan & Lu, Jun & Yang, Haotian, 2023. "What triggered China's urban debt risk? Snowball effect under the growth target constraint," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 1-13.
- Gueorgui I. Kolev & Robin Hogarth, 2008. "Illusory correlation in the remuneration of chief executive officers: It pays to play golf, and well," Economics Working Papers 1132, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Jean-Daniel Guigou & Patrick De Lamirande & Bruno Lovat, 2011. "Strategic delegation and collusion: Do incentive schemes matter?," LSF Research Working Paper Series 11-02, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
- Marco Celentani & J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Klaus Desmet, 2004.
"Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk Sharing,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(3), pages 758-787, July.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Marco Celentani & J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Klaus Desmet, "undated". "Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk Sharing," Working Papers 2003-08, FEDEA.
- Celentani, Marco & Desmet, Klaus & Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio, 2003. "Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk-Sharing," CEPR Discussion Papers 3866, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Celentani & J. Ignacio Conde & Klaus Desmet, 2002. "Endogenous policy leads to inefficient risk sharing," Economics Working Papers 593, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2003.
- Celentani, Marco & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002.
"Corruption and competition in procurement,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1273-1303, July.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000. "Corruption and competition in procurement," Economics Working Papers 464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001.
- Celentani, Marco, et al, 1996.
"Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 691-704, May.
- Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008. "Maintaining A Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 9, pages 163-176, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
See citations under working paper version above.- Marco Celentani, 1993. "Maintaining a Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent," Discussion Papers 1075R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Marco Celentani, 1996.
"Reputation with observed actions (*),"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(3), pages 407-419.
- Celentani, Marco, 1996. "Reputation with Observed Actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(3), pages 407-419, April.
Cited by:
- Pesendorfer, Wolfgang & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1998.
"When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?,"
Scholarly Articles
3203775, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg, 1995. "When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible?," Discussion Papers 1114, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 6, pages 95-120, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 46-71, March.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible," Levine's Working Paper Archive 180, David K. Levine.
- Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
- Melkonian, Tigran A., 1998. "Two essays on reputation effects in economic models," ISU General Staff Papers 1998010108000012873, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Celentani, Marco, et al, 1996.
"Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 691-704, May.
- Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008. "Maintaining A Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 9, pages 163-176, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Marco Celentani, 1993. "Maintaining a Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent," Discussion Papers 1075R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Celentani, Marco & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996.
"Reputation in Dynamic Games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 109-132, July.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Marco Celentani & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1992. "Reputation in Dynamic Games," Discussion Papers 1009, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.