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Ingredients of institutional reputations and citizen engagement with regulators

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  • Tereza Capelos
  • Colin Provost
  • Maria Parouti
  • Julie Barnett
  • Jonathan Chenoweth
  • Chris Fife‐Schaw
  • Tanika Kelay

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the link between the reputational components of efficacy and moral reliability of institutions, and citizens' compliance with institutional recommendations. Research on bureaucratic reputations highlights the significance of positive political reputations based on credibility and legitimacy, but the impact of these components is not systematically isolated and studied. We draw insights from political psychology to move beyond a positive‐negative valence‐based approach of reputation, and highlight the different effect of efficacy and moral reliability components of reputation on citizens' cooperation, engagement in water saving activities, and levels of complaints. We use the Cypriot Water Authority as a case study and inquire how its institutional reputation influences Cypriot citizens' behavior regarding water use. Our data was collected via a representative national survey administered to a random sample of 800 Cypriots in the spring of 2009 and show that favorable perceptions of particular components of institutional reputation shape the levels of satisfaction with specific organizational outputs.

Suggested Citation

  • Tereza Capelos & Colin Provost & Maria Parouti & Julie Barnett & Jonathan Chenoweth & Chris Fife‐Schaw & Tanika Kelay, 2016. "Ingredients of institutional reputations and citizen engagement with regulators," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(4), pages 350-367, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:10:y:2016:i:4:p:350-367
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12097
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Koen Verhoest & Jan Boon & Stefan Boye & Heidi H. Salomonsen, 2023. "How does organizational task matter for the reputation of public agencies?," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 158-176, January.
    2. Tobias Bach & Marlene Jugl & Dustin Köhler & Kai Wegrich, 2022. "Regulatory agencies, reputational threats, and communicative responses," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1042-1057, October.
    3. Nicholas Bautista‐Beauchesne, 2022. "Building anti‐corruption agency collaboration and reputation: Hanging together or separately hanged," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1399-1419, October.

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