Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629808100762
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
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- M. Rodwan Abouharb & David Cingranelli & Mikhail Filippov, 2019. "Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 8(5), pages 1-22, May.
- Mason Dyana P., 2015. "Advocacy in Nonprofit Organizations: A Leadership Perspective," Nonprofit Policy Forum, De Gruyter, vol. 6(3), pages 297-324, November.
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Keywords
bureaucracy; common agency; congressional oversight; multiple principals;All these keywords.
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