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The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems

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  • MICHAEL HECHTER

    (University of Arizona)

Abstract

Game-theoretical analyses of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) supergame aim to deduce the existence of wholly endogenous solutions to collective action problems. So far, however, game theory has been unable to identify a unique equilibrium solution to the PD supergame. This lack of success, together with the assumption of complete and perfect information, suggests that these purely deductive searches for endogenous solutions are insufficient for understanding collective action problems in the real world. To be of use in the social sciences, applied game theory must be oriented toward specifying the links between its abstract categories and actual social structures.

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  • Michael Hechter, 1992. "The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 33-40, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:33-40
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463192004001005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Piotr Swistak, 1992. "What Games? Why Equilibria? Which Equilibria?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 103-116, January.
    2. James W. Friedman, 1992. "Views on the Relevance of Game Theory," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 41-50, January.
    3. Yan Li & Fiona Yao & David Ahlstrom, 2015. "The social dilemma of bribery in emerging economies: A dynamic model of emotion, social value, and institutional uncertainty," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 311-334, June.
    4. Bo Rothstein & Daniel Eek, 2009. "Political Corruption and Social Trust," Rationality and Society, , vol. 21(1), pages 81-112, February.
    5. Werner Raub & Thomas Voss & Jeroen Weesie, 1992. "On the Usefulness of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 95-102, January.
    6. Eric Rasmusen, 1992. "Heterogeneous Players and Specialized Models," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 83-94, January.
    7. John C. Harsanyi, 1992. "In Defense of Game Theory," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 51-61, January.
    8. Bo Rothstein, 2000. "Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memories," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(4), pages 477-501, October.
    9. Roger B. Myerson, 1992. "On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 62-73, January.
    10. Andreas Flache & Rainer Hegselmann, 1999. "Rationality vs. Learning in the Evolution of Solidarity Networks: A Theoretical Comparison," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 97-127, July.
    11. Michael Hechter & Satoshi Kanazawa, 1993. "Group Solidarity and Social Order in Japan," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(4), pages 455-493, October.

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