IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jothpo/v5y1993i4p455-493.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Group Solidarity and Social Order in Japan

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Hechter
  • Satoshi Kanazawa

Abstract

This paper seeks to explain why Japan has attained a higher level of social order than comparably developed western national societies. To do so, it distinguishes the attainment of local order in social groups from the global order in national societies. Recent models of spontaneous, self-organizing order are insufficient to account for global order. In contrast to the more popular normative explanation of order in Japan, which holds that a consensus on fundamental values derived from Confucian roots is an essential cause, this paper proposes a solidaristic theory built on rational choice premises. This new theory views global order as a by-product of dependence and visibility mechanisms within key social groups such as families, schools and firms. A wide range of comparative evidence reveals that the solidaristic theory provides a superior explanation of the high level of social order in Japan than the normative one.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Hechter & Satoshi Kanazawa, 1993. "Group Solidarity and Social Order in Japan," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(4), pages 455-493, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:5:y:1993:i:4:p:455-493
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692893005004002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951692893005004002
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0951692893005004002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1990. "Games Real Actors Could Play: The Problem of Connectedness," MPIfG Discussion Paper 90/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    2. Michael Hechter, 1992. "The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 33-40, January.
    3. Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 404-417, June.
    4. Martin Kenney & Richard Florida, 1988. "Beyond Mass Production: Production and the Labor Process in Japan," Politics & Society, , vol. 16(1), pages 121-158, March.
    5. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1990. "Games Real Actors Could Play," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(4), pages 471-494, October.
    6. Toyohiro Kono, 1984. "Strategy and Structure of Japanese Enterprises," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-17627-4, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lopez, Tará Burnthorne & Babin, Barry J. & Chung, Christina, 2009. "Perceptions of ethical work climate and person-organization fit among retail employees in Japan and the US: A cross-cultural scale validation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(6), pages 594-600, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bruno S. Frey, 1991. "Demand for, and Supply of, Institutions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(2), pages 258-260, April.
    2. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1991. "Games Real Actors Could Play: The Challenge of Complexity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(3), pages 277-304, July.
    3. Zintl, Reinhard, 1995. "Der Nutzen unvollständiger Erklärungen: Überlegungen zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Anwendung der Spieltheorie," MPIfG Discussion Paper 95/2, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    4. Michael Hechter, 1992. "The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 33-40, January.
    5. Scharpf, Fritz W. & Mohr, Matthias, 1994. "Efficient self-coordination in policy networks: A simulation study," MPIfG Discussion Paper 94/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    6. Steven J. Brams, 1991. "Comments on Scharpf's “Games Real Actors could Playâ€," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(2), pages 252-257, April.
    7. Benz, Arthur, 1991. "Mehr-Ebenen-Verflechtung: Politische Prozesse in verbundenen Entscheidungsarenen," MPIfG Discussion Paper 91/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    8. Benz, Arthur & Scharpf, Fritz W. & Zintl, Reinhard, 1992. "Horizontale Politikverflechtung: Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 10, number 10.
    9. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1994. "Games Real Actors Could Play," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(1), pages 27-53, January.
    10. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1993. "Positive und negative Koordination in Verhandlungssystemen," MPIfG Discussion Paper 93/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    11. Makowsky, Michael D. & Wang, Siyu, 2018. "Embezzlement, whistleblowing, and organizational architecture: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 58-75.
    12. Zakaria Babutsidze & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2019. "Digital Communication and Swift Trust," Post-Print halshs-02409314, HAL.
    13. Christian Thöni, 2014. "Inequality aversion and antisocial punishment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 529-545, April.
    14. Robert Roßner & Dimitrios Zikos, 2018. "The Role of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Among Resource Users on Water Governance: Lessons Learnt from an Economic Field Experiment on Irrigation in Uzbekistan," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(03), pages 1-30, July.
    15. Astrid Dannenberg & Carlo Gallier, 2020. "The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(3), pages 716-749, September.
    16. Bose, Neha & Sgroi, Daniel, 2019. "The Role of Theory of Mind and “Small Talk” Communication in Strategic Decision-Making," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 409, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    17. Thommes, Kirsten & Vyrastekova, Jana & Akkerman, Agnes, 2015. "Behavioral spillovers from freeriding in multilevel interactions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 78-87.
    18. Arhan Ertan & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2005. "Can Endogenously Chosen Institutions Mitigate the Free-Rider Problem and Reduce Perverse Punishment?," Working Papers 2005-13, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    19. Karbowski, Adam, 2011. "O kilku modelach samolubnego karania w ekonomii behawioralnej [Evolution of altruism in the light of behavioral economics]," MPRA Paper 69604, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Kenju Kamei & Louis Putterman, 2018. "Reputation Transmission Without Benefit To The Reporter: A Behavioral Underpinning Of Markets In Experimental Focus," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 158-172, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:5:y:1993:i:4:p:455-493. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.