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What Games? Why Equilibria? Which Equilibria?

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  • PIOTR SWISTAK

    (University of Maryland at College Park)

Abstract

This article focuses on selected claims made by three authors about game theory: “What games?†(Aaron Wildavsky), “Why equilibria?†(Gordon Tullock), and “Which equilibria?†(Michael Hechter). The intention is to bring some balance to the debate by pointing to the fact that most of the arguments discussed are conditional; they are true under some assumptions but false under others. The power of game theory stems from the fact that it enables us to seek solutions no matter what assumptions we believe to be true about the modeled phenomenon.

Suggested Citation

  • Piotr Swistak, 1992. "What Games? Why Equilibria? Which Equilibria?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 103-116, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:103-116
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463192004001012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
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    7. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
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    1. Yan Li & Fiona Yao & David Ahlstrom, 2015. "The social dilemma of bribery in emerging economies: A dynamic model of emotion, social value, and institutional uncertainty," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 311-334, June.

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