IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ratsoc/v4y1992i1p41-50.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Views on the Relevance of Game Theory

Author

Listed:
  • JAMES W. FRIEDMAN

    (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)

Abstract

This article comments on the works by Michael Hechter, Gordon Tullock, and Aaron Wildavsky that are critical of game theory. Although most of the points raised by the authors have merit, some are not relevant to game theory (as opposed to the misuse of game theory within social science). Those points pertaining to game theory vary in importance from quite central to exceedingly peripheral.

Suggested Citation

  • James W. Friedman, 1992. "Views on the Relevance of Game Theory," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 41-50, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:41-50
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463192004001006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1043463192004001006
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1043463192004001006?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
    2. Aaron Wildavsky, 1992. "Indispensable Framework or Just another Ideology?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 8-23, January.
    3. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    4. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    5. Ordeshook,Peter C., 1986. "Game Theory and Political Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521315937, October.
    6. Gordon Tullock, 1992. "Games and Preference," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 24-32, January.
    7. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    8. Michael Hechter, 1992. "The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 33-40, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Piotr Swistak, 1992. "What Games? Why Equilibria? Which Equilibria?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 103-116, January.
    2. John C. Harsanyi, 1992. "In Defense of Game Theory," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 51-61, January.
    3. Athreya, Kartik B., 2014. "Big Ideas in Macroeconomics: A Nontechnical View," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262019736, April.
    4. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2003. "Towering over Babel: Worlds Apart but Acting Together," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 03-A009, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    5. Werner Raub & Thomas Voss & Jeroen Weesie, 1992. "On the Usefulness of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 95-102, January.
    6. Antonio Penta & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2022. "Rationalizability, Observability, and Common Knowledge," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(2), pages 948-975.
    7. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1995. "Subjective games and equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 123-163.
    8. George Tsebelis, 1990. "Penalty has no Impact on Crime:," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(3), pages 255-286, July.
    9. Eric Rasmusen, 1992. "Heterogeneous Players and Specialized Models," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 83-94, January.
    10. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2011. "Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(2), pages 455-492.
    11. Harsanyi John C., 1995. "A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 318-332, August.
    12. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July.
    13. Ma, Chenghu, 2000. "Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 451-482, March.
    14. Van Huyck, John B. & Cook, Joseph P. & Battalio, Raymond C., 1997. "Adaptive behavior and coordination failure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 483-503, April.
    15. Coggins, Jay S., 1993. "Rationalizing the International Coffee Agreement Virtually," Staff Papers 200569, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    16. Roger B. Myerson, 1992. "On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 62-73, January.
    17. Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H., 2010. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 264-286, January.
    18. Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2000. "The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(3), pages 677-687.
    19. Ambrus, Attila, 2006. "Coalitional Rationalizability," Scholarly Articles 3200266, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    20. Jackson, Matthew O. & Sonnenschein, Hugo F., 2003. "The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency," Working Papers 1159, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:41-50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.