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Games Real Actors Could Play

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  • FRITZ W. SCHARPF

    (Max Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, West Germany)

Abstract

The use of game-theoretical explanations and predictions in empirical social science research is often thought to be precluded by the unrealism of the cognitive and computational capabilities that mathematical game theory imputes to its idealized “players†as well as by the prohibitive information costs that an attempt to reconstruct these cognitions and computations would impose on researchers. The article tries to show that these misgivings are exaggerated. Under realistic conditions actors will often be able to pragmatically approximate complete-information conditions regarding each other's strategy options and payoffs. Moreover, empirical research will, in many situations, be able to reconstruct actors' relevant opportunities, perceptions and preferences from socially constructed institutions, norms, and expectations that have always been the subject of mainstream social science research.

Suggested Citation

  • Fritz W. Scharpf, 1990. "Games Real Actors Could Play," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(4), pages 471-494, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:2:y:1990:i:4:p:471-494
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463190002004005
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Hechter, 1992. "The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 33-40, January.
    2. Scharpf, Fritz W. & Mohr, Matthias, 1994. "Efficient self-coordination in policy networks: A simulation study," MPIfG Discussion Paper 94/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    3. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1994. "Games Real Actors Could Play," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(1), pages 27-53, January.
    4. Bruno S. Frey, 1991. "Demand for, and Supply of, Institutions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(2), pages 258-260, April.
    5. Benz, Arthur, 1991. "Mehr-Ebenen-Verflechtung: Politische Prozesse in verbundenen Entscheidungsarenen," MPIfG Discussion Paper 91/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    6. Zintl, Reinhard, 1995. "Der Nutzen unvollständiger Erklärungen: Überlegungen zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Anwendung der Spieltheorie," MPIfG Discussion Paper 95/2, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    7. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1991. "Games Real Actors Could Play: The Challenge of Complexity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(3), pages 277-304, July.
    8. Benz, Arthur & Scharpf, Fritz W. & Zintl, Reinhard, 1992. "Horizontale Politikverflechtung: Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 10, number 10.
    9. Steven J. Brams, 1991. "Comments on Scharpf's “Games Real Actors could Playâ€," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(2), pages 252-257, April.
    10. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1993. "Positive und negative Koordination in Verhandlungssystemen," MPIfG Discussion Paper 93/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    11. Michael Hechter & Satoshi Kanazawa, 1993. "Group Solidarity and Social Order in Japan," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(4), pages 455-493, October.

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