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Involuntary disputes: When competition for members forces smaller unions to strike

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  • Agnes Akkerman

Abstract

Industrial relations theory has produced two conflicting hypotheses on the effects of multi-unionism on the incidence of industrial conflict. International comparative research proposes that unions organizing the same worker domains are prone to competition, for which industrial conflict is used as a means of propaganda. British economic research claims that unions organizing substitutable workers cooperate and act as one union. This study argues that apparent cooperation is not always voluntary action but is sometimes the result of a loss of autonomy caused by competition and a lack of mobilization power. Micro-level data on industrial action are used to test hypotheses of the conditions for such involuntary participation in labor disputes.

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  • Agnes Akkerman, 2014. "Involuntary disputes: When competition for members forces smaller unions to strike," Rationality and Society, , vol. 26(4), pages 446-474, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:26:y:2014:i:4:p:446-474
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463114546312
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Kirsten Thommes & Agnes Akkerman & René Torenvlied & Marieke Born, 2014. "The dark side of solidarity: social norms and social relations in the aftermath of strikes," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 348-367, July.
    6. Oswald, Andrew J, 1979. "Wage Determination in an Economy with Many Trade Unions," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(3), pages 369-385, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jon Las Heras & Lluis Rodríguez, 2021. "Striking to Renew: Basque Unions’ Organizing Strategies and Use of the Strike‐Fund," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 59(3), pages 669-700, September.

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