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Die Deregulierung von Berufszugangsbeschränkungen und die Corona-Krise

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  • Rasch Alexander

    (Professor für angewandte Mikroökonomik, Düsseldorfer Institut für WettbewerbsökonomieUniversitätsstraße 1, 40225DüsseldorfDeutschlandResearch Associate, Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, L 7, 1, 68161 Mannheim)

  • Waibel Christian

    (ETH ZürichOberassistent, Department of Management, Technology, and EconomicsZürichbergstraße 18, 8092ZürichSchweiz)

Abstract

The corona virus crisis and its negative impact on the German economy call for countermeasures. This article discusses the impact of one measure: the deregulation of restrictions on access to certain professions that operate in markets with informational asymmetries. Firms’ persistence in such markets is crucial for both employees and customers. Previous analysis of provisions that reduced restrictions on access to professional craftsmen’s markets in 2004 has shown that the deregulation led to a decrease of firms’ persistence. Moreover, while the measures led to an increase in the total number of firms and an increase in employment in craftsmen’s markets, the fact that most of the newly hired employees worked part time dampened the effect on the total number of working hours. On the customers’ side, the deregulation led to lower prices, but also, potentially, to lower quality. Furthermore, the lower persistence is problematic given the information asymmetry.

Suggested Citation

  • Rasch Alexander & Waibel Christian, 2020. "Die Deregulierung von Berufszugangsbeschränkungen und die Corona-Krise," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 69(2), pages 121-128, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:69:y:2020:i:2:p:121-128:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2020-2033
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    References listed on IDEAS

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