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Der Markt für politische Zitronen

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  • Steinrücken, Torsten

Abstract

Der vorliegende Aufsatz zeigt, dass der Übergang von einer direkten zu einer indirekten Demokratie und die Einschaltung von Repräsentanten nicht nur mit dem Entstehen eines Delegationsproblems zwischen den Bürgern und Politikern verbunden ist, sondern zusätzlich Negativauslese der politischen Zitronen den Nutzen der Delegation für die Bürger schmälern kann. Besteht auf der Nachfrageseite Unkenntnis über die Qualität der kandidierenden Politiker kann dies zur adversen Auslese und einer Verschärfung der Prinzipal-Agent-Probleme bei der Entscheidungsdelegation führen. Gleichwohl existieren verschiedene Instrumente, die einem Versagen der Marktallokation aufgrund bestehender Informationsmängel und einer Entwicklung des Marktes für Politiker zu einem Markt für politische Zitronen entgegenwirken. Einige diesbezügliche Instrumente werden in ihrer Wirkungsweise dargestellt und ihre Praktikabilität aus ökonomischer Sicht diskutiert.

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  • Steinrücken, Torsten, 2001. "Der Markt für politische Zitronen," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 20, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:20
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    References listed on IDEAS

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