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The value of typical products : the case of Prosciutto di Parma and Parmigiano Reggiano cheese

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  • Arfini, Filippo

Abstract

This note has two goals. The first one is analysing the problems related to the presence of information asymmetry on PDOIPGI marketed products and the role played by the "intermediate" institutions, i.e. Consortia, on their strategy. The second goal consists in estimating the value that consumers attach to the European and Consortia labels considering two famous POD products, namely Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese and Prosciutto di Parma (Parma ham), and then in making considerations on the future strategies to be adopted. The method to be used refers to the willingness of the consumer to pay. This method is usually used to determine the values of public goods that, as such, have no price. In this case, the WTP is justified by the fact that the PDO label can be considered a public good whose value depends on the ability to reduce the gap towards the consumer. The study has been carried out considering a sample of consumers selected on the basis of income and social origin, as well as on the indications supplied by the two Consortia involved.

Suggested Citation

  • Arfini, Filippo, 1999. "The value of typical products : the case of Prosciutto di Parma and Parmigiano Reggiano cheese," 67th Seminar, October 28-30, 1999, LeMans, France 241032, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:eaae67:241032
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.241032
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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Anania & Rosanna Nisticò, 2004. "Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in Quality Food Markets: What if the Trust Substitute cannot be Fully Trusted?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 681-701, December.
    2. Krystallis, Athanasios & Papadopoulou, Victoria & Chryssochoidis, George M., 2004. "The Positioning of Greek Feta Cheese in a Local UK Market: A Major Marketing Strategy Problem," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 5(2), pages 1-16, August.
    3. Vecchio, Riccardo & Annunziata, Azzurra, 2011. "The role of PDO/PGI labelling in Italian consumers’ food choices," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 12(2).
    4. Galli, Francesca & Carbone, Anna & Caswell, Julie A. & Sorrentino, Alessandro, 2011. "A Multi-Criteria Approach to Assessing PDOs/PGIs: An Italian Pilot Study," International Journal on Food System Dynamics, International Center for Management, Communication, and Research, vol. 2(3), pages 1-18, December.
    5. Arfini, Filippo & Pazzona, Marina, 2014. "The Coexistence of PDO and Brand Labels: The Case of the Ready-sliced Parma Ham," 2014 International European Forum, February 17-21, 2014, Innsbruck-Igls, Austria 199377, International European Forum on System Dynamics and Innovation in Food Networks.
    6. Leonardo Cei & Edi Defrancesco & Gianluca Stefani, 2018. "From Geographical Indications to Rural Development: A Review of the Economic Effects of European Union Policy," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(10), pages 1-21, October.
    7. Gorton, Matthew & Torok, Aron & Tregear, Angela, 2014. "The Impact of EU Agri-food Quality Policy in the New Member States: A Case Study of the Makó Onion PDO," 142nd Seminar, May 29-30, 2014, Budapest, Hungary 169085, European Association of Agricultural Economists.

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