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Macroeconomic stabilization through monetary and fiscal policy coordination: Implications for European Monetary Union

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  • Jay Bryson

Abstract

In a two-country model, we consider the implications of monetary and fiscal policy coordination for macroeconomic stabilization. We show that the optimal regime is one of monetary and fiscal policy coordination under flexible exchange rates. In the context of the European Community, this suggests that the desire to fix exchange rates may not be costless. In addition, we show that fiscal coordination requires a relatively high degree of flexibility in fiscal policy. This result suggests that limits on the flexibility of fiscal policies, as suggested in the Delors Report, may hinder macroeconomic stabilization. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994

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  • Jay Bryson, 1994. "Macroeconomic stabilization through monetary and fiscal policy coordination: Implications for European Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 307-326, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:5:y:1994:i:4:p:307-326
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01000717
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    Cited by:

    1. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Bovenberg, A Lans, 2000. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 247-269, March.
    2. Onorante, Luca & Pedregal, Diego J. & Pérez, Javier J. & Signorini, Sara, 2010. "The usefulness of infra-annual government cash budgetary data for fiscal forecasting in the euro area," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 98-119, January.
    3. Michał Laskowski, 2016. "Instytucjonalne uwarunkowania wspólnej polityki pieniężnej w Unii Gospodarczej i Walutowej / Institutional Framework of Single Monetary Policy in The Economic and Monetary Union," International Economics, University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, issue 16, pages 313-331, December.
    4. Goran Petrevski & Jane Bogoev & Dragan Tevdovski, 2015. "The transmission of foreign shocks to South Eastern European economies," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 747-767, November.
    5. Joseph Daniels & David VanHoose, 1998. "Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 265-284, July.
    6. Jensen, Svend Erik Hougaard & Jensen, Lars Grue, 1995. "Debt, deficits and transition to EMU: A small country analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 3-25, March.
    7. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. Lans, 1997. "Central bank independence and public debt policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(4-5), pages 873-894, May.
    8. Nicola Acocella, "undated". "The theoretical roots of EMU institutions and policies during the crisis," Working Papers 126/14, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e Modelli per l'Economia, il Territorio e la Finanza MEMOTEF.
    9. Petrevski, Goran & Exterkate, Peter & Tevdovski, Dragan & Bogoev, Jane, 2015. "The transmission of foreign shocks to South Eastern European economies: A Bayesian VAR approach," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 632-643.

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