Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?
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- Roel Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Frank Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," CESifo Working Paper Series 599, CESifo.
- Roel Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Franc Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," IHEID Working Papers 04-2001, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
- Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Klaassen, Franc, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
WP; monetary policy; fiscal authorities; interest rate; aggregate demand; EMU; fiscal coordination; shocks; demand management; loss function; solvency constraint; governments vis-à-vis; point of view; Representative government; inflation rate; Inflation; Supply shocks; Real interest rates; Price stabilization; Europe; E. fiscal policy coordination; Policy coordination; EMU desirable; IMF Institute;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EEC-2002-04-03 (European Economics)
- NEP-IFN-2002-04-03 (International Finance)
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