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Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?

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  • Joseph Daniels
  • David VanHoose

Abstract

This paper surveys the literature that uses two-country models to analyze monetary and fiscal policy issues faced in interdependent economies. We discuss sources of structural interdependence that researchers typically include in these models. We describe many of the types of policy interactions that researchers have considered and summarize the key results that they have obtained. Finally, we briefly explain the limitations of two-country models and outline directions that this literature might usefully be extended. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Daniels & David VanHoose, 1998. "Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 265-284, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:9:y:1998:i:3:p:265-284
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008220801959
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    3. Chortareas, Georgios & Mavrodimitrakis, Christos, 2017. "Strategic fiscal policies and leadership in a monetary union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 133-147.

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