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Union monétaire : différences structurelles et asymétrie des chocs

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  • Laskar, Daniel

Abstract

[fre] Union monétaire : différences structurelles et asymétrie des chocs. . On étudie le rôle sur la mise en place d'une union monétaire de deux types de disparités entre pays. L'une concerne la différence entre leurs tendances structurelles à générer de l'inflation ; l'autre est relative au degré d'asymétrie des chocs affectant leurs économies. Prenant en compte simultanément, dans un modèle à deux pays, les questions de coordination des politiques monétaires et celles liées à la crédibilité de celles-ci, on analyse comment se détermine le choix entre trois systèmes de change : un système de change flexible ; un système de change fixe asymétrique où le pays structurellement le moins inflationniste est le leader ; et enfin une union monétaire.. Si la convergence structurelle des économies apparaît favorable à la création d'une union monétaire, le degré d'asymétrie des chocs s'avère avoir un effet ambigu pour différentes raisons qu'on est en mesure d'expliciter. [eng] Monetary union: structural differences and asymmetry of shocks. . We study the role that two types of disparities between countries may have on the creation of a monetary union. One concerns the difference between their structural tendencies to generale inflation ; the other is the degree of asymmetry of shocks which affect their economies. In a two country framework taking into account both the issue of coordination of monetary policies between countries and that of the credibility of these policies, we analyze the choice between three exchange rate Systems : a flexible exchange rate System ; an asymmetric exchange rate system where the leader is the country which is structurally less inflationary ; and, finally, a monetary union.. Il the structural convergence of countries appears to be favorable to the creation of a monetary union, the degree of asymmetry of shocks, on the contrary, is shown to have an ambiguous effect for several reasons that we make explicit.
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  • Laskar, Daniel, 1992. "Union monétaire : différences structurelles et asymétrie des chocs," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9207, CEPREMAP.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:9207
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    1. Boyer, Robert, 1998. "An essay on the political and institutional deficits of the Euro. The unanticipated fallout of the European Monetary Union," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9813, CEPREMAP.
    2. Daniel Laksar, 1994. "Choix d'un régime de change : le rôle des questions de crédibilité et d'interdépendance entre pays," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(3), pages 515-528.
    3. Laskar, Daniel, 1997. "Union monétaire à deux vitesses : asymétrie du système de change entre pays membres et non-membres," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9703, CEPREMAP.

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