IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/atlecj/v32y2004i2p100-112.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Newspaper quality, pulitzer prizes, and newspaper circulation

Author

Listed:
  • Brian Logan
  • Daniel Sutter

Abstract

Many journalists and journalism scholars contend that the profit motive of commercial media companies conflicts with the supply of high quality journalism. However, media companies should supply high quality news if quality yields sufficiently greater revenues. Quality journalism may not increase audience either because of a lemons problem or because consumers do not value the product dimensions that journalists do. The authors test whether news quality matters in a cross-section of U.S. newspapers. Newspapers winning Pulitzer Prizes in recent years have significantly higher circulation, even when controlling for the economic, demographic, and media characteristics of their markets. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Brian Logan & Daniel Sutter, 2004. "Newspaper quality, pulitzer prizes, and newspaper circulation," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 32(2), pages 100-112, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:32:y:2004:i:2:p:100-112
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02298828
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF02298828
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF02298828?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grier, Kevin B & McGarrity, Joseph P, 1998. "The Effect of Macroeconomic Fluctuations on the Electoral Fortunes of House Incumbents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 143-161, April.
    2. Martinelli, Cesar, 2006. "Would rational voters acquire costly information?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 225-251, July.
    3. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
    4. Chalk, Andrew, 1986. "Market Forces and Aircraft Safety: The Case of the DC-10," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(1), pages 43-60, January.
    5. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    6. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
    7. Mitchell, Mark L & Maloney, Michael T, 1989. "Crisis in the Cockpit? The Role of Market Forces in Promoting Air Travel Safety," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages 329-355, October.
    8. Jarrell, Gregg & Peltzman, Sam, 1985. "The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 512-536, June.
    9. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Olivier Gergaud & Florine Livat, 2004. "Team versus individual reputations: a model of interaction and some empirical evidence," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla04015, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    2. Grolleau, Gilles & Caswell, Julie A., 2006. "Interaction Between Food Attributes in Markets: The Case of Environmental Labeling," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1-14, December.
    3. Steinrücken, Torsten, 2001. "Der Markt für politische Zitronen," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 20, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    4. Arfini, Filippo, 1999. "The value of typical products : the case of Prosciutto di Parma and Parmigiano Reggiano cheese," 67th Seminar, October 28-30, 1999, LeMans, France 241032, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. Bowen, Robert M. & DuCharme, Larry & Shores, D., 1995. "Stakeholders' implicit claims and accounting method choice," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 255-295, December.
    6. Ernst, Holger & Wickede, Anje, 1999. "Einflußfaktoren auf die Glaubwürdigkeit kundenorientierter Produkt-Vorankündigungen: Ein signaltheoretischer Ansatz," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 515, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.
    7. Manuel Gonzalez-Diaz & Marta Fernandez Barcala & Benito Arrunada, 2003. "Quality assurance mechanisms in agrifood: the case of the Spanish fresh meat sector," International Journal of Agricultural Resources, Governance and Ecology, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(3/4), pages 361-382.
    8. Giovanni Anania & Rosanna Nisticò, 2004. "Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in Quality Food Markets: What if the Trust Substitute cannot be Fully Trusted?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 681-701, December.
    9. Peter-Jan Engelen, 2011. "Legal versus Reputational Penalties in Deterring Corporate Misconduct," Chapters, in: Mehmet Ugur & David Sunderland (ed.), Does Economic Governance Matter?, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Mishra, Debi P., 2013. "Firms’ strategic response to service uncertainty: An empirical signaling study," Australasian marketing journal, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 187-197.
    11. Adler, Moshe, 1987. "Economies of Scale in Imitative Consumption and the Size of the Firm: Theory and an Application to Chain Restaurants," Working Papers 225922, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    12. Bartke, Stephan, 2015. "The economic role of valuers in real property markets," UFZ Discussion Papers 13/2015, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
    13. Karsten Mause, 2010. "Considering Market-Based Instruments for Consumer Protection in Higher Education," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 29-53, March.
    14. Haucap, Justus, 2017. "The rule of law and the emergence of market exchange: A new institutional economic perspective," DICE Discussion Papers 276, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    15. Julie A. Caswell & Eliza M. Mojduszka, 1996. "Using Informational Labeling to Influence the Market for Quality in Food Products," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1248-1253.
    16. Zago, Angelo M. & Pick, Daniel H., 2004. "Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public Intervention, and Welfare Effects," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(1), pages 1-16, April.
    17. Andrew Cooke & Wendy Chapple, 1998. "Guilty by Association? The Case of The Karin B Scare," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 5-12, January.
    18. Alexander, Cindy R, 1999. "On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 489-526, April.
    19. Peter E. Earl & Ti-Ching Peng, 2011. "Home Improvements," Chapters, in: Samuel Cameron (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Leisure, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Welling, Michael & Krebs, Alexander & Graefe, Gernot, 2006. "Pandora's Box: Does Electronic Commerce Increase the Optimal Amount of Fraud," 99th Seminar, February 8-10, 2006, Bonn, Germany 7762, European Association of Agricultural Economists.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:32:y:2004:i:2:p:100-112. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.