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Einflußfaktoren auf die Glaubwürdigkeit kundenorientierter Produkt-Vorankündigungen: Ein signaltheoretischer Ansatz

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  • Ernst, Holger
  • Wickede, Anje

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  • Ernst, Holger & Wickede, Anje, 1999. "Einflußfaktoren auf die Glaubwürdigkeit kundenorientierter Produkt-Vorankündigungen: Ein signaltheoretischer Ansatz," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 515, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cauman:515
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kirmani, Amna, 1990. "The Effect of Perceived Advertising Costs on Brand Perceptions," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 17(2), pages 160-171, September.
    2. Ernst, Holger & Schnoor, Anje, 1999. "Die Signalwirkung des Vorankündigungsaufwandes und von Patentinformationen in kundenorientierten Produkt-Vorankündigungen," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 516, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.
    3. repec:fth:harver:1473 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    5. BALTZER, Overgaard, 1990. "On the nature of advertising and its role as a signal of quality," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1990026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    7. Zvi Griliches, 1998. "Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey," NBER Chapters, in: R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence, pages 287-343, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Ippolito, Pauline M, 1990. "Bonding and Nonbonding Signals of Product Quality," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 41-60, January.
    9. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
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    11. Mizuno, Makoto & Odagiri, Hiroyuki, 1990. "Does advertising mislead consumers to buy low-quality products?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 545-558, December.
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    19. Kirmani, Amna & Wright, Peter, 1989. "Money Talks: Perceived Advertising Expense and Expected Product Quality," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 16(3), pages 344-353, December.
    20. Mark N. Hertzendorf, 1993. "I'm Not a High-Quality Firm -- But I Play One on TV," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(2), pages 236-247, Summer.
    21. Kevin B. Hendricks & Vinod R. Singhal, 1997. "Delays in New Product Introductions and the Market Value of the Firm: The Consequences of Being Late to the Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(4), pages 422-436, April.
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    23. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    25. Boulding, William & Kirmani, Amna, 1993. "A Consumer-Side Experimental Examination of Signaling Theory: Do Consumers Perceive Warranties as Signals of Quality?," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 20(1), pages 111-123, June.
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