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The Effect of Macroeconomic Fluctuations on the Electoral Fortunes of House Incumbents

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  • Grier, Kevin B
  • McGarrity, Joseph P

Abstract

The effect of macroeconomic fluctuations on House elections is a long debated, but still unresolved, issue. We argue that return rates are theoretically superior to vote shares as measures of electoral accountability and that incumbents, not candidates of the president's party, are the legislators voters hold responsible. We develop and test an incumbent accountability model using incumbent return rates in the U.S. House from 1916 to 1994, finding a strongly significant effect of both income growth and the misery index. However, the data reject both our pure incumbency model and the traditional presidential party model, indicating that both factors are relevant to voters. Copyright 1998 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Grier, Kevin B & McGarrity, Joseph P, 1998. "The Effect of Macroeconomic Fluctuations on the Electoral Fortunes of House Incumbents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 143-161, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:41:y:1998:i:1:p:143-61
    DOI: 10.1086/467387
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Polsby, Nelson W., 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 144-168, March.
    2. Bloom, Howard S. & Price, H. Douglas, 1975. "Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions: the Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 1240-1254, December.
    3. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    4. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    5. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Toma & Richard Cebula, 2001. "Politicians, deficits, and monetary policy in the U.S. revisited," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 7(4), pages 419-430, November.
    2. Enrique López‐Bazo, 2022. "The Impact of Cohesion Policy on Regional Differences in Support for the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(5), pages 1219-1236, September.
    3. Bialkowski, Jedrzej & Gottschalk, Katrin & Wisniewski, Tomasz Piotr, 2008. "Stock market volatility around national elections," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(9), pages 1941-1953, September.
    4. Edward López & Carlos Ramírez, 2008. "Mr. Smith and the economy: the influence of economic conditions on individual legislator voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 1-17, July.
    5. Joseph McGarrity, 2005. "Macroeconomic conditions and committee re-election rates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 453-480, September.
    6. Joseph McGarrity, 2001. "Vote share and return rates: A comparison of two measures of election outcomes," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(3), pages 294-303, September.
    7. Brian Logan & Daniel Sutter, 2004. "Newspaper quality, pulitzer prizes, and newspaper circulation," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 32(2), pages 100-112, June.
    8. Edward López & Carlos Ramírez, 2004. "Party Polarization and the Business Cycle in the United States," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 413-430, February.
    9. Muhammad Shahid Akram & Toseef Azid, 2006. "Economics of Regaining Office: The Case of Pakistan (1947-2005)," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 45(4), pages 913-923.
    10. Amanat ALI* & Eatzaz AHMAD** & BILAWAL***, 2019. "SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEPRIVATIONS AND VOTERS’ PREFERENCES: A District Level Analysis," Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics, Applied Economics Research Centre, vol. 29(2), pages 181-199.

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