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Multitasking at work: Do firms get what they pay for?

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  • Ann P. Bartel

    (Colombia Business School, USA)

Abstract

To align employees’ interests with the firm’s goals, employers often use performance-based pay, but designing such a compensation plan is challenging because performance is typically multifaceted. For example, a sales employee should be incentivized to sell the company’s product, but a focus on current sales without rewarding the salespeople according to the quality of the product and/or customer service may result in fewer future sales. To solve this problem, firms often increase the number of metrics by which they evaluate their employees, but complex compensation plans may be difficult for employees to understand.

Suggested Citation

  • Ann P. Bartel, 2017. "Multitasking at work: Do firms get what they pay for?," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 362-362, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izawol:journl:2017:n:362
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Fuhai Hong & Tanjim Hossain & John A. List & Migiwa Tanaka, 2018. "Testing The Theory Of Multitasking: Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment In Chinese Factories," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 511-536, May.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Jirjahn, Uwe & Mohrenweiser, Jens, 2023. "Variable Payment Schemes and Productivity: Do Individual-Based Schemes Really Have a Stronger Influence than Collective Ones?," IZA Discussion Papers 16267, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Minkyung Kim & K. Sudhir & Kosuke Uetake, 2019. "A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce: Multidimensional Incentives and Plan Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2199R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2021.
    3. Minkyung Kim & K. Sudhir & Kosuke Uetake, 2022. "A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce: Incentives, Private Information, and Job Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(6), pages 4602-4630, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    incentives; multitasking; gaming; balanced scorecard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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