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Multi-Task Agents and Incentives: The Case of Teaching and Research for University Professors

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  • Marta De Philippis

Abstract

This paper exploits a natural experiment to study the effects of providing stronger research incentives to faculty members on universities’ average teaching and research performance. The results indicate that professors are induced to reallocate effort from teaching towards research. Moreover, tighter research requirements affect the faculty composition, as they lead lower-research-ability professors to leave. Given the estimated positive correlation between teaching and research ability, those who leave are also characterized by lower teaching ability. The average effect on teaching for the university is therefore ambiguous, as positive composition effects countervail effort substitution.

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  • Marta De Philippis, 2021. "Multi-Task Agents and Incentives: The Case of Teaching and Research for University Professors," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1643-1681.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:131:y:2021:i:636:p:1643-1681.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Galasso, Alberto & Luo, Hong & Zhu, Brooklynn, 2023. "Laboratory safety and research productivity," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(8).
    3. Giovanni Abramo & Ciriaco Andrea D’Angelo & Myroslava Hladchenko, 2023. "Assessing the effects of publication requirements for professorship on research performance and publishing behaviour of Ukrainian academics," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 128(8), pages 4589-4609, August.
    4. Palali, Ali & van Elk, Roel & Bolhaar, Jonneke & Rud, Iryna, 2018. "Are good researchers also good teachers? The relationship between research quality and teaching quality," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 40-49.

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    JEL classification:

    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics

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