IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cvs/starer/94-04.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Productivity Under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Nalbantian, Haig
  • Schotter, Andrew

Abstract

This paper presents an experimental examination of a variety of group incentive programs. The authors investigate simple revenue sharing and more sophisticated, target-based systems such as profit sharing or productivity gainsharing, as well as tournament-based and monitoring schemes. Their results can be characterized by three facts: (1) history matters-how a group performs in one incentive scheme depends on its history together under the scheme that preceded it; (2) relative performance schemes outperform target-based schemes; and (3) monitoring can elicit high effort from workers, but the probability of monitoring must be high and, therefore, costly. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Nalbantian, Haig & Schotter, Andrew, 1994. "Productivity Under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 94-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:94-04
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:94-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Anne Stubing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aenyuus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.