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Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis

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  • Max Albert
  • Werner Güth
  • Erich Kirchler
  • Boris Maciejovsky

Abstract

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past individual (their partner’s donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one’s choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be irrelevant. Copyright Economic Science Association 2007

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  • Max Albert & Werner Güth & Erich Kirchler & Boris Maciejovsky, 2007. "Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(1), pages 53-69, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:10:y:2007:i:1:p:53-69
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9131-3
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    1. Jia, Z. Tingting & McMahon, Matthew J., 2020. "Being watched in an investment game setting: Behavioral changes when making risky decisions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    2. Diego Gambetta & Wojtek Przepiorka, 2014. "Natural and Strategic Generosity as Signals of Trustworthiness," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(5), pages 1-9, May.
    3. Alexis Garapin & Daniel Llerena & Michel Hollard, 2011. "When a Precedent of Donation Favors Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(4), pages 409-421, November.
    4. Tracy Xiao Liu & Jenna Bednar & Yan Chen & Scott Page, 2019. "Directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in multiple repeated games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(3), pages 705-734, September.
    5. Egbert, Henrik, 2017. "The Gift and Pay-What-You-Want Pricing," MPRA Paper 82066, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Servátka, Maros, 2010. "Does generosity generate generosity? An experimental study of reputation effects in a dictator game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 11-17, January.
    7. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2005. "Behaviour in a Two-Stage Two Public Goods Experiment," Experimental 0504002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Greiff Matthias & Egbert Henrik, 2017. "The Pay-What-You-Want game: What can be learned from the experimental evidence on Dictator and Trust Games?," Management & Marketing, Sciendo, vol. 12(1), pages 124-139, March.
    9. Greiff, Matthias & Egbert, Henrik, 2016. "The Pay-What-You-Want Game and Laboratory Experiments," MPRA Paper 75222, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Boulu-Reshef, Béatrice & Kuechle, Graciela & Rohland, Luise Marie, 2024. "Signaling trustworthiness with the choice of a prosocial project: Theory and experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    11. Fehrler, Sebastian & Przepiorka, Wojtek, 2016. "Choosing a partner for social exchange: Charitable giving as a signal of trustworthiness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 157-171.
    12. Bernhard E. Reichert & Matthias Sohn, 2022. "How Corporate Charitable Giving Reduces the Costs of Formal Controls," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 176(4), pages 689-704, April.
    13. Cason, Timothy N. & Savikhin, Anya C. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2012. "Behavioral spillovers in coordination games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 233-245.
    14. Friedel Bolle & Jessica Kaehler, 2007. "Introducing a Signaling Institution: An Experimental Investigation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(3), pages 428-447, September.
    15. Max Albert & Vanessa Mertins, 2008. "Participation and Decision Making: A Three-person Power-to-take Experiment," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200805, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    16. Horne, Christine & Kennedy, Emily Huddart, 2017. "The power of social norms for reducing and shifting electricity use," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 43-52.
    17. Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth & Efraim Sadka & Adi Sharoni, 2019. "Charitable Constributions by Businesses: A Tax Policy Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 7836, CESifo.
    18. Banerjee, Ritwik, 2016. "Corruption, norm violation and decay in social capital," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 14-27.
    19. Bonein, Aurélie & Serra, Daniel, 2007. "Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity," MPRA Paper 3257, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2007.
    20. Haley Brokensha & Lina Eriksson & Ian Ravenscroft, 2016. "Charity, signaling, and welfare," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 15(1), pages 3-19, February.
    21. Huck, Petra, 2008. "Zur Übertragbarkeit der Erkenntnisse der experimentellen Spieltheorie auf Beobachtungen zu Gabe und Gegengabe," ZögU - Zeitschrift für öffentliche und gemeinwirtschaftliche Unternehmen, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 31(1), pages 72-87.
    22. Dolan, Paul & Galizzi, Matteo M., 2015. "Like ripples on a pond: Behavioral spillovers and their implications for research and policy," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 1-16.
    23. Fehrler, Sebastian & Przepiorka, Wojtek, 2013. "Charitable Giving as a Signal of Trustworthiness: Disentangling the Signaling Benefits of Altruistic Acts," IZA Discussion Papers 7148, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; Conditional cooperation; Connected games; Donation behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution

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