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Does increased teacher accountability decrease leniency in grading?

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  • Puhani, Patrick A.
  • Yang, Philip

Abstract

Because accountability may improve the comparability that is compromised by lenient grading, we compare exit exam outcomes in the same schools before and after a policy change that increased teacher accountability by anchoring grading scales through centralization. In particular, using a large administrative dataset of 364,445 exit exam outcomes for 72,889 students, we find that centralization increased inequality in scoring between the higher and lower performing schools by about 25%. In addition, the reform improved relative scoring outcomes for schools with larger shares of male students and lowered relative scoring outcomes for schools with a higher share of minority students.

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  • Puhani, Patrick A. & Yang, Philip, 2020. "Does increased teacher accountability decrease leniency in grading?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 333-341.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:171:y:2020:i:c:p:333-341
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.017
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    Cited by:

    1. Lang, Matthias, 2019. "Communicating subjective evaluations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 163-199.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Subjective performance evaluation; Rating standards; Policy reform; Transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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